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Some scientists react to the difficulties of establishing cause and 
effect by withdrawing into their shells and refusing to say that the 
relationships they find are anything more than correlations ... But 
decisionmakers cannot avoid making judgment. . . The decision 
maker want to know what to change so that he can achieve the effect 
he wants.
Julian Simon and Paul Burstein 
Basic Research Methods in Social Science
General Concepts and Methods in 
Gross Impact Evaluation
Managers of nearly all organizations  human services and private 
sector businesses alike examine the outcomes of their efforts and 
compare their own achievements with those of other similar organiza 
tions. Descriptions of outcomes and comparisons across organizations 
can be valuable management tools, but can also be misleading. The gross 
impact evaluation model offers guidance for maximizing the usefulness 
of these management tools while avoiding errors commonly encountered 
in the attempt. As Blalock argues in chapter 1, we want to facilitate 
evaluations that remain closely tied to management information needs, 
but go beyond program monitoring, both in terms of goals and methods.
The Perspective Taken in Conducting Gross Impact Evaluations
Evaluation research is often viewed as remote from service delivery  
as serving distant purposes or as serving no purpose. However, the 
analysis of data on services and outcomes can be a valuable management
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tool guiding program development efforts. In addition, with the advent 
of computerized management systems, such analysis has become fea 
sible in the majority of human services organizations as well as in the for- 
profit sector. Data systems put in place to facilitate record-keeping and 
report generation can be extended efficiently to provide a basis for the 
analysis of service quality and effectiveness. Perhaps these factors help 
explain why a recent survey finds many service delivery areas (SDAs) in 
the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) system expressing a special 
interest in systematic self-analysis (Seattle-King County 1985).
Systematic descriptions of program outcomes can focus policy plan 
ning discussions. Further, analysis that compares the effects of program 
alternatives can identify strong and weak areas of current services, in 
terms of their impacts on outcomes. The ability to focus change efforts 
on low performance areas and to identify high performance approaches 
as models for planning can enable a continuous improvement of services. 
It amounts to "technological advance" for service organizations, where 
effective technology knowing what transformations produce desired 
outputs has been difficult to develop. This capacity to direct change 
intelligently not only improves program services, but also provides staff 
with a sense of efficacy the sense that they are able to affect the quality 
of their own work. Staff burnout has been identified as an ongoing 
problem in job training organizations (Franklin and Ripley 1984). One 
partial solution is putting the tools for more effective management in the 
hands of local staff.
Even where a foundation of previous research has been laid, analyses 
by local or state service delivery systems is valuable. Management 
decisions must be specific: shall we implement services this way or that, 
place participants with this type of trainer or that, deliver this set of 
services or that? The local context determines which alternatives are 
available and also the relative effectiveness of each. Thus, to apply 
national research findings to local settings, while the only recourse in the 
absence of better information, is a less reliable management guide than 
developing local knowledge. For example, Wilms (1980) found no 
difference between public and proprietary vocational trainers in South 
ern California, while Simpson (1982) found public schools substantially
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more effective than proprietary schools for CETA participants in Wash 
ington State. To make policy decisions in either area based on research 
in the other area would be unfortunate.
Gross impact analysis is the study of program outcomes among 
program participants only. It resembles net impact analysis in that it 
focuses on outcomes and their probable causes, but it differs from net 
impact analysis in that no comparison group of nonparticipants is 
involved. Gross impact analysis provides quantitatively reliable knowl 
edge about program quality and effectiveness, with the goal of guiding 
program development. The method builds efficiently on already-exist 
ing data collections adding data elements as required, to improve validity 
at a reasonable cost. Postprogram follow-up surveys are used to measure 
program outcomes. Program qualities tested for their possible influence 
on outcome levels are measured using available management informa 
tion systems (MIS) and, where applicable, by collecting additional data 
describing services delivered to specific individuals and forms of pro 
gram implementation developed by various service providers.
Questions Gross Impact Analysis Cannot Address
Among the wide range of possible impacts of any human services 
program, only a smaller set can be addressed using the gross impact 
approach. Several important society-wide goals of employment-related 
programs are essentially impossible to study definitively, because legis 
lation that improves the situation of some individuals may be creating or 
overlooking problems among other individuals. These impacts include 
(1) increasing national productivity, (2) reducing total national unem 
ployment, (3) reducing average job turnover time, and (4) improving the 
skill level and, therefore, the flexibility of the overall labor force.
In addition, gross impact analysis cannot draw any conclusions 
concerning the types or degree of change caused by participation in a 
particular program. This question can only be addressed by net impact 
studies, which compare program participants with similar individuals 
who did not participate in the program (see Johnson and Stromsdorfer, 
chapter 2). Gross outcomes refer to total postprogram outcomes; net 
impacts estimate the proportion of total outcomes that may be uniquely
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attributed to participation in the program intervention. This means that 
gross impact studies cannot estimate the extent to which participation in 
a program changes individuals, the cost-effectiveness of a program, the 
time it takes for participants to repay the cost of a program in taxes 
generated by program success, or the impact of the program on reducing 
other costs such as welfare supports.
Questions Gross Impact Analysis Can Address
There are two broad categories of analysis goals for which the gross 
impact approach is well-suited: (1) describing a broad range of program 
outcomes, and (2) estimating the unique impact on outcomes produced 
by alternative methods of delivering services. The statistical assump 
tions underlying these and the power of the conclusions which can be 
drawn from them are so different that the remainder of this chapter will 
refer to them separately, as gross outcomes analysis and differential 
impact analysis. The first term avoids the word impact as a reminder that 
no cause-and-effect impact can be estimated using descriptive analysis.
The Description of Gross Outcomes
The description of gross program outcomes does not allow the eval- 
uator to infer causation to assume that the program or some aspect of 
the program is responsible for the outcomes observed. This type of 
analysis is well-suited to describing a wide range of outcomes for 
participants, employers, or others, with results available in a relatively 
short time. Descriptive findings in themselves imply no success or 
failure, but can be evaluated against managers' expectations. Descriptive 
data may also help establish reasonable new baseline expectations for 
outcomes not previously measured systematically. Descriptive gross 
outcomes can also be used as tools to identify problem areas that deserve 
more detailed analysis. Finally, the ability to measure relatively numer 
ous and detailed outcomes provides a way to describe the range of 
program outcomes, and how programs are achieving their impacts. For 
example, job training program outcomes can include such issues as 
whether employment is training-related, whether fringe benefits are 
provided, whether promotions are likely, and whether employers are 
satisfied with the programs.
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Gross outcomes may be described for one office, one organization 
with multiple offices, or a system including more than one service 
delivery organization. However, where more than one organization or 
office is described, caution must be exercised in interpreting any com 
parisons that are made. Outcome comparisons tend to be interpreted by 
research consumers as if caused by differences in program effective 
ness an error, given the limitations of descriptive analysis.
The careful description of program outcomes is often a necessary 
element of process evaluations (discussed by Grembowski in chapter 4 
of this volume). Two foci of gross impact evaluations broadening the 
scope of outcomes measured and exercising technical care during 
measurement are therefore particularly valuable to process evalu 
ations. By the same token, a process analysis can be extremely valuable 
in identifying the particular outcomes that are appropriate to measure as 
part of a gross impact evaluation for a given organization.
Differential Impact Analysis
The second type of analysis proposed here does involve the estimation 
of cause and effect. Differential impact analysis is a method for rigorously 
comparing program variants—alternative service strategies and alter 
native approaches to implementing service delivery. Different program 
services and implementation forms can be compared to assess whether, 
other things equal, one or more alternatives are more effective than 
others in producing desired outcomes. That is, the unique impact of each 
program variant can be estimated in comparison to all other program 
variants being used in a program during the analysis. Participants 
experiencing each program variant act as a comparison group for those 
experiencing other variants. This opens the way to a wide range of 
analysis questions that might be asked by managers. The specific 
questions depend on what program variations exist in a particular service 
delivery system, and on the areas in which managers are most interested 
in developing information. The term program variants is used here as 
shorthand to include all existing program alternatives in services as 
signed to individual clients and in forms of implementation found among 
service providers in the service delivery system.
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Within the constraints of sample size, these same questions can be 
asked for particular populations of participants: which treatment modes 
are most effective for target group A, and which for group B? 1 Compari 
sons can also be made among service providers. This means that states 
can improve the reliability and meaningfulness of comparisons made 
among local agencies, and can also identify especially valuable direc 
tions for program technical assistance efforts, as long as the influences 
of environmental conditions and other important differences among 
agencies are taken into account.
Differential impact analysis is especially well-suited to program 
development efforts because of its ability to identify program variants 
that influence the program's ability to produce desired outcomes within 
the limits of the particular clients it serves and within the range of 
treatments available to it. It cannot tell us whether a program is worth 
retaining. However, given that a program exists, it can point the way 
toward making it operate more effectively.
Differential impact analysis recognizes that the most serious threat to 
reliable comparisons among program variants is selection bias. Clients 
who select or are selected for different program variants often differ from 
each other in ways that influence probable postprogram success. The 
impact of such client background differences must be accounted for 
before the unique impact of program variants can be identified. Other 
wise, estimates of program variants are biased. Although no set of 
measures could ever estimate all selection effects, it is possible for 
analysts who know a particular service delivery system well to construct 
measures that will prevent a considerable proportion of the bias that can 
be caused by unmeasured selection. Each additional investment in such 
preventative steps improves the validity of the research findings.
The second major threat to differential impact analysis is from 
confounded program variants—service strategies or program implem 
entation modalities that completely overlap one another. If all clients 
assisted through a particular service provider are assigned services that 
differ in, for example, three ways from services given all other clients in 
a system, it is impossible to determine which of these three might account 
for a higher or lower success rate by that provider. The treatments overlap
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so completely that they cannot be separated statistically; they are con 
founded with one another.
Similarly, any time one service delivery organization implements 
program variants that are entirely unique, the analyst encounters at least 
two factors that are confounded: whether participants experienced the 
specific program variant in question, and whether they enrolled through 
the specific organization in question. Thus, completely overlapping 
implementation by more than one provider as well as completely unique 
implementation by any provider constitute confounded program vari 
ants, which make fully accurate differential impact analysis impossible. 
This means that the differential impact analysis of treatment variants 
becomes possible only when the treatment system being studied includes 
a sufficient number of service providers or service tracks that implement 
services differently, but not completely differently, from each other.
The Types of Factors Measured During Gross Impact Evaluations
Both descriptive outcome analysis and differential impact analysis 
require measures of program outcomes. These may be recorded by 
service providers, reported by participants during follow-up surveys, or 
reported by employers. In addition, differential impact analysis requires 
the measurement of program variants and "control variables." Program 
variants may be measured at the individual level, indicating which 
specific services each participant received, or at the service provider 
level, indicating how programs are implemented for the average client. 
Control variables include a wide range of selection factors that can bias 
findings if excluded from the analysis.
An overview of the various types of measures that may be involved in 
gross impact designs is provided in exhibit 3.1. Measures are grouped 
according to the source of each measure, and the purpose each measure 
serves in an analysis (outcome, program variant, control variable). The 
intersection of each type of outcome variable with each type of program 
variant shown in the exhibit indicates a major relationship studied using 
this approach. In exhibit 3.1, these relationships are indicated by letters 
A through N. Any given differential impact analysis involves the relation 
ship between one outcome variable and some number of test variables
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(program variants) along with the control variables included to protect 
against selection bias or other sources of error. Within this structure, each 
test variable represents an "hypothesized" effect on the outcome in 
question.
Exhibit 3.1 also indicates the most likely sources for each type of 
measure, recognizing that measurement decisions depend on the nature 
of each service delivery system. Outcomes are measured through obser 
vation of participants or relevant others. Some outcomes are observed by 
service providers, while others require special data collection. Surveys 
of service providers are inexpensive because their numbers are small 
compared to participants; however, they can measure only implementa 
tion variants, not individual service variants. Participant service records 
kept by service providers are both more reliable and less expensive than 
measures included during follow-up interviews of former participants.
Exhibit 3.1
Nature and Sources of Measures That May Be Included 
in Gross Impact Analysis
The Purpose of Each Measure and Its Relation to JTPA
PROGRAM VARIANTS Controls
OUTCOMES FOR Service against
Data Source Participants Others Implementation treatment bias
Survey of service providers F J
Participant treatment kept 
by service providers D G* H K
Standard MIS files A L 
Participant follow-up surveys B I**
Follow-up surveys of others, 
such as employers C E M
Published data by locality N
* Individual service treatment records may be aggregated to indicate typical agency patterns.
"* Selected treatment variants can be measured through participant follow-up surveys, although 
these require retrospective reports
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Variables measured as controls against bias can come from many 
sources, depending on the specific design of the analysis. Service 
providers, participants, and others, such as employers or referral agen 
cies, can provide valuable data concerning the selection process. Service 
providers also implement policies that affect selection bias. This does not 
mean the analyst should ask service providers for their interpretation of 
their own selection processes. Rather, it means that once the analyst has 
identified specific selection policies and practices likely to affect out 
comes, these will be measured most validly through reports from those 
directly implementing or experiencing the process. In addition, MIS files 
and published demographic and labor market data report standard 
variables known to affect labor market success and are, therefore, 
necessary to include in differential impact analyses. One strength of the 
gross impact approach is inflexible ability to measure multiple indica 
tors of selection into particular service treatments.
The Design of Gross Impact Evaluation Studies
Nearly all modern human services organizations have committed 
records of client characteristics at intake and services received to the 
electronic memory banks of micro- or minicomputers. The relatively 
ready access an analyst has to these MIS records lays the initial base for 
inexpensive, yet valid, gross impact evaluation studies. Client popula 
tions can be defined and samples drawn from these MIS records, with 
individuals identified for inclusion in a study at either entry or termina 
tion from the program. Once the population all clients who participated 
in the particular programs to be analyzed is defined, representative 
samples can be assured by using a variety of convenient random selection 
methods. The population should include clients enrolled throughout a 
calendar year if the program experiences seasonal fluctuations in out 
comes, and should proportionately represent all geographic areas from 
which clients are drawn.
MIS records may be augmented to improve the power of a given study 
to evaluate specific aspects of program services. In addition, standard 
survey research methods can be employed to perform short-term follow- 
up data collection on program participants or other relevant actors such
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as employers, treatment facilities, or school administrators. For longer- 
period follow-ups, the problem of noncompletions reduces the value of 
the survey approach. For programs with mobile clientele, establishing 
good locater information on clients will be critical to the success of 
follow-up survey efforts. The construction of surveys, drawing of 
samples, and conducting of survey interviews are tasks about which 
much is known, making guidance readily available (e.g., Fink 1985; 
Babbie 1989; Rossi, Wright, and Anderson 1983; Frey 1983; Dillman 
1978). In addition, the availability of university-based survey research 
centers, as well as private research firms, makes expert guidance readily 
available in most areas.
Analysis of gross impact data often can be performed on the same 
computers used to store MIS data, using one of the readily available 
statistical analysis packages. Any package that calculates percentage 
distributions, chi square with percentaged tables, analysis of variance 
tests comparing means, and multiple regression is adequate for the needs 
of nearly all gross impact evaluation efforts.
The Application of Gross Impact Evaluation Concepts and 
Methods to the Case Example: JTPA
The remainder of this chapter illustrates the gross impact analysis 
approach by offering methodological guidance tailored specifically to 
one program, the Job Training Partnership Act. Much of what is said here 
applies to any job training program, and with a little translation, to any 
human services program. Conceptualization, design, measurement, and 
analysis issues in gross impact evaluations, however, are illustrated 
within the vocabulary of JTPA services and the JTPA service provider 
system. This section begins with a discussion of the proper uses of 
descriptive outcome analysis, then moves on to differential impact 
analysis and the study of employer outcomes.
The Uses and Limits of Descriptive Gross Outcomes Analysis
Descriptive analysis takes its name from its goal of examining out 
comes without making causal attributions. Descriptive patterns may be
Evaluating Gross Program Outcomes 143
reported on the basis of data covering all participants or estimated from 
a sample of participants. Where sampling is involved, proper procedure 
will generate unbiased estimates of patterns characterizing all partici 
pants as well as information on how accurate those estimates are.
Descriptive data are relatively easy to collect and report, but also easy 
to misinterpret. This discussion, therefore, takes two directions: (1) 
identifying ways to make gross impact description most useful to JTPA 
managers, and (2) identifying the major limits on its valid interpretation.
Avoiding Interpretations that Imply Causality
As the term description indicates, the primary limitation on descrip 
tive data analysis is that it involves none of the research design or analysis 
techniques designed for explaining causal relationships. The major 
reason for this limitation is that descriptive analysis offers no compari 
sons. For example, if we learn that employers are highly satisfied, we 
cannot know whether the reason is the friendly service, the quality of 
participants placed with them, reimbursement they may have received, 
a general tendency to answer positively, or a variety of other possibilities. 
We can guess, but the research findings offer no guidance until compari 
sons are made in this example, comparisons between employers train 
ing more- and less-qualified participants, with higher and lower reim 
bursement levels.
This limitation does not mean that managers must refrain from 
interpretation. We all interpret the world daily. It means that managers 
must not assume that the findings themselves imply a particular interpre 
tation. Thus, the first of the following two statements a JTPA manager 
might make is flatly incorrect, while the second could be correct.
1. "We find employers to be highly satisfied with JTPA, proving that 
we are sending them the types of employees they want."
2. "We find employers to be highly satisfied with JTPA. In my opinion, 
this is true because we are sending them the types of employees they 
want." 
Statement 2 avoids incorrect causal attributions, while also stating a
possible interpretation that could be examined through further analysis.
The value of the descriptive rinding is that it identifies the facts the
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manager may work with and may attempt to explain. We can learn how 
satisfied employers are. The limitation is that the findings do not 
themselves offer any causal explanation for the level observed.
The most common error in interpreting descriptive data on job training 
programs is to assume that outcomes described after the completion of 
a program are caused by the program. In the heat of political battle, I may 
say, "Look what our program has accomplished; we have 84 percent 
placement rates!" In so stating, I may be taking credit for upswings in the 
economy, for individuals who recovered from temporary unemploy 
ment, and for random change, as well as for cases where employment was 
produced by the program.2 Similarly, if I claim that one service provider 
is "better" (causes greater success) than another on the basis of descrip 
tive findings, I err by assuming that the difference was produced by 
program services alone, which cannot be demonstrated using descriptive 
statistics. Such claims are problematic not only because they are subject 
to self-serving interpretations, but also because they often tend to mire 
program development efforts in the most obvious and least useful 
interpretations some vague improvement in "management," "cream 
ing" efforts, economic shifts, and so on.
Broadening the Range of Outcomes Measured
The most basic way in which descriptive analysis can improve a 
program manager's information base is by taking advantage of its 
flexibility to enlarge the range of outcomes measured. We are too often 
wedded to the narrow range of outcomes readily available from agency 
records or required by government performance standards. These meas 
ures should be included in any descriptive analysis, but the addition of 
further outcome measures offers considerable benefits: the identifica 
tion of unrecognized areas of program quality or problems, and the 
expansion of managerial decisionmaking into quality-enhancement rather 
than program-compliance only.
A hierarchy of outcomes may be arranged according to the extent to 
which each is required for a meaningful analysis of JTPA. Some states 
or SDAs may wish to include only a minimal core set of measures, 
making the follow-up as brief and inexpensive as possible and limiting
Evaluating Gross Program Outcomes 145
Exhibit 3.2 
Prioritized Participant Outcome Measures
1. Required postprogram performance standard standards
• Employed during 13th week after termination?
• Earnings during 13th week
• Number of weeks worked, during 13-week follow-up period.
2. Other core measures explicit in JTPA mandate
• Employment, including:
— Hours per week employed at follow-up
— Pre- to postprogram change in hours per week and percent weeks employed.
• Earnings, including:
— Hourly wage rate at follow-up
— Total earnings from termination to follow-up.
— Preprogram to postprogram change in wages and earnings.
• Welfare dependency, including.
— Whether receiving public assistance at follow-up.
— Monthly dollar amount of public assistance at follow-up.
— Total public assistance received between termination and follow-up
— Preprogram to postprogram change in public assistance received.
3. Measures of skill transfer and utilization
• Whether employment is in training-related field.
• Proportion of the work utilizing skills from training
• For employer-based interventions, retention with that employer.
4. Measures of job quality
• Benefits (medical, retirement plans; paid vacations; sick leave).
• Likelihood of layoffs or reduction in hours
• Likelihood of promotion and/or raises.
5. Measures characterizing those not employed at follow-up
• Why termination job was lost or left, if applicable.
• Whether participant is seeking work, and if not, why not
6. Subjective orientations of participants
• Intention to make use of the JTPA intervention (career orientation).
• Personal evaluation of JTPA program services
• Personal evaluation of postprogram job.
• Personal comparison of postprogram job with preprogram job.
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their analysis options accordingly. Others may wish to mount a more 
comprehensive analysis, once the decision is made to expend initial set 
up costs. The marginal increase in cost from inclusion of all six types of 
measures discussed below is small, making it logical to measure all. 
Nevertheless, some measures add information without being necessary 
to the research effort. With this distinction in mind, exhibit 3.2 displays 
outcomes in six categories, from highest (1) to lowest (6) priority.
The most basic outcomes focus on the explicit JTPA mandate that 
JTPA be considered an investment in individual lives an investment in 
human capital. As such, it should show returns in higher probability of 
employment, higher earnings, and lower dependence on public assis 
tance. Three measures are required by the Department of Labor. Beyond 
those, the survey method allows various components of employment and 
earnings, such as hours worked and wage rate, to be specified.
Although measures indicating skill transfer and utilization are not 
explicated as outcomes in the legislation, they are clearly implied. They 
represent the most direct impact of training-based interventions, and are 
especially sensitive to program variants, making these outcomes particu 
larly useful to managers who wish to develop their programs based on 
differential impact analysis. They are also particularly useful for descrip 
tive analysis, because findings indicate, in and of themselves, the extent 
to which outcomes are being produced via the method presupposed for 
all training programs.
In addition to wages, various intangible benefits from employment 
and indirect forms of income, such as medical benefits, are important 
aspects of job quality. A prime indicator of probable long-range employ 
ment success is whether the overall quality of each job places it into the 
category sometimes characterized as the "primary labor market" or into 
the "secondary labor market" (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Vermeulen 
and Hudson-Wilson 1981). Primary labor market jobs are relatively 
stable, include gradually improving income and benefit levels, are 
usually full time, include the possibility of promotion, include fringe 
benefits and are, in general, the types of jobs that can reasonably become 
a career. Secondary labor market jobs seldom include benefits, possibil 
ity of promotion, or a system of pay increments, are often part time, and 
are subject to layoffs. Even where a short-term follow-up shows partici-
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pants retaining employment, jobs in the secondary labor market repre 
sent a poor risk for long-term employment stability.
Finally, the lowest priority outcomes are measures of participants' 
satisfaction. They are lower priority than other measures because their 
meaning is less clear, they are less reliably measured than other out 
comes, and they have been excluded from most job training legislation 
and evaluation studies. Nevertheless, they are much to be recommended. 
They can offer valuable information to JTPA program operators, and 
they are inexpensive to add to participant interviews. In particular, 
subjective indicators of job adjustment may be extremely important to 
measure in cases where the transition into the workforce is expected to 
be especially problematic, e.g., in the case of long-term welfare recipi 
ents. Job satisfaction has surprisingly little correspondence to earnings, 
but is considerably influenced by job quality and skill use, making this 
subjective measure useful for assessing quality of program placements.
Asking Questions
One important approach to both limits and potentials of descriptive 
analysis is to ask meaningful questions without demanding more com 
plex comparisons than allowed. Some questions involve no interpreta 
tion; they simply seek baseline descriptive information. Other questions 
may be worded specifically enough that a descriptive answer will assist 
the analyst in developing or confirming explanations. The following 
questions illustrate this point:
1. Does it appear that program goals are being met? If I know roughly 
which levels of program outcomes are expected, measuring out 
comes lets me know whether I am in condition red, yellow, or green. 
Descriptive levels do not tell me why outcomes are higher or lower 
than expected, or whether my program itself has much to do with 
producing those outcomes. However, they tell me whether I need to 
look for factors creating low outcomes, whether high or low outcome 
levels are concentrated in particular program activities, and whether 
my organization is in better shape with regard to some outcomes than 
others. That is, descriptions of outcome levels can let managers 
know whether to worry, and which program areas to worry about 
most actively.
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For some postprogram outcomes those mandated as postpro- 
gram performance standards clear expectations will be estab 
lished. When expectations are unclear, descriptive measures can 
help establish reasonable baseline expectations. These would consti 
tute first approximations that might be improved upon in subsequent
2. Does any service provider appear worth learning more about? One 
particularly useful application of descriptive analysis as a first 
approximation is the comparison ofSDAs or subcontracting service 
providers. Such comparisons should be interpreted with great care, 
since agency performance levels are influenced by factors over 
which program operators have no control, such as the local economy, 
or may result from policies not intended by the act, such as increasing 
performance rates by serving those with least need. Descriptive 
differences point out where further investigation might be most 
useful, helping to pose questions correctly rather than answering 
them.
3. Is there any apparent change over time? Descriptive outcome figures 
kept over time each month for example can be used to form a 
baseline series indicating stability or change in services provided 
and program outcomes. Such a "time series" can sometimes alert 
managers to unexpected changes. It can also provide a relatively 
inexpensive first approximation of the effects of major program 
changes made during the time series.
Investigating Specific Propositions
One major strategy of multivariate analysis is to test a particular 
interpretation by seeing whether competing explanations for the ob 
served findings can be eliminated. This tactic is not available for 
descriptive analysis. However, the same general strategy may be fol 
lowed by posing questions thoughtfully and specifically enough to 
logically reduce the range of findings that would be consistent with the 
particular explanation proposed.
There is little value in asking broad questions such as: does on-the-job 
training (OJT) produce more placements than classroom training (CT)? 
Too many different interpretations could reasonably explain either
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positive or negative findings. However, specific propositions direct 
expectations to only a few findings, //"the expected finding occurs, then 
we have greater faith in the correctness of the proposition guiding the 
analysis.3
For example, if I identify some JTPA program activities as skill train 
ing programs, I will expect that a disproportionate number of postpro- 
gram job placements will be in the skill area. I have no a priori way to 
set expected levels, but descriptive findings are nevertheless interpret- 
able. If only 2 percent of workers in my area are cashiers, and only 6 
percent of my CT participants have previous experience as cashiers, then 
a finding that 65 percent of employed graduates from my cashier training 
class are cashiers suggests that the program is working in the way I 
envisioned. This does not indicate how well the program works, only that 
my proposed explanation about the way it works is supported.
Another example involves the question: what accounts for nonreten- 
tion of jobs held at JTPA termination? Several specific propositions are 
easy to imagine, each suggesting its own specific measures. For example, 
if JTPA participants lack the ability to learn complex skills, instances of 
nonretention should occur most often when the training or the job 
involved complex skills or where the participant's preprogram skills 
were weakest. Similarly, employers should often report that the partici 
pant was unable to perform complex tasks. If these variables are 
measured along with others indicating alternative explanations, manag 
ers can assess which explanations account best for the patterns observed.
As a final example, one may argue that JTPA should move participants 
into primary labor market positions (Taggart 1981). One could examine 
the degree to which this occurs by measuring qualities of postprogram 
jobs that define the primary labor market, as shown in exhibit 3.2. 
Findings would not indicate the degree to which JTPA treatment caused 
the job quality mix observed, but they would recommend greater or 
lesser concern about program quality, depending on the number of jobs 
exhibiting the desired qualities.
Perceptions Held by Employers and Participants
Some questions are inherently descriptive. If I wonder what impor-
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tance employers place on various qualities of individuals they hire, I can 
ask them to tell me. Although it is always possible for data on such 
perceptions to be limited by incorrect self-knowledge or by misleading 
responses, these perceptions are appropriately interpreted in their de 
scriptive form. The same is true of participants' job satisfaction or other 
participant perceptions in which JTPA managers may have interest. 
Similarly, employers' satisfaction with JTPA and their perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of participating in OJT or Work Experience may be 
taken at face value, as long as one recognizes that the information 
indicates no more than perception, and that perceptions do not necessar 
ily reflect program impact.
Illustrations of Informative Descriptive Analyses
Several illustrations of descriptive findings are reported here, all taken 
from one statewide study of GET A OJT conducted in Washington State 
(Simpson 1984a). The findings displayed in exhibit 3.3 illustrate that 
measuring training-related employment as well as overall employment
Exhibit 3.3
Percent of 107 AFDC Recipients and
755 Others in Each of Four Employment Statuses
Six Months after Termination from CETA OJT
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at follow-up helps avoid jumping to an erroneous conclusion. If only the 
percent employed or not employed at follow-up were displayed, we 
would observe the expected pattern: AFDC recipients are employed at a 
rate about 9 percent below the rate for non-AFDC participants. We might, 
therefore, be led to conclude that AFDC recipients are less job-ready or 
less personally stable, and therefore fail more often than others to retain 
their OJT jobs. A program manager might consider imposing more 
counseling on AFDC participants, offering more support services during 
OJT contracts, or placing fewer AFDC recipients in OJT, although it is 
widely known to produce the highest postprogram placement rates.
However, when the outcome is presented with a slight increase in 
specificity, these interpretations no longer appear logical. AFDC and 
non-AFDC participants retain their OJT jobs at equal rates. They also 
move to other, training-related jobs at equal rates. The entire differential 
in employment is produced by the fact that among the 60 percent of 
participants who did not remain with their OJT employers or in the field 
of their OJT positions, non-AFDC recipients were two-thirds more likely 
to find work outside the OJT field. Now the most likely interpretation is 
that AFDC recipients are much less able to locate jobs without the 
assistance of the job training program, as shown by their relative lack of 
success once they leave the positions into which they were leveraged by 
OJT subsidies. However, once the program assisted their job entry, they 
retained their positions as often as their more employable colleagues. 
This means that the OJT program is doing well at equalizing the chances 
of AFDC people in the short run, but it also means that the OJT program 
effects are not carrying over to later job search success.4
Exhibit 3.4 illustrates the value of an extremely basic analysis of 
follow-up data. A group of OJT participants is followed from the 
beginning of their OJT contracts through contract completion and nine 
months beyond. The percent of the initial group who remain employed 
with their initial OJT employer has been calculated at several points 
during the OJT contracts, and monthly after termination. The findings 
graphed in exhibit 3.4 fall into three segments, so clear as to be quite 
valuable in their descriptive state.
During the OJT contract, some gradual attrition occurs, so that on the
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Exhibit 3.4
Percent of CETA OJT Participants
Retained with Their OJT Employers
During and After OJT Contracts
25 50 75 100
Percent Contract Completed
+1 +3 +5 +7 9
Months After Contract
date of contract completion, only 83 percent of the original placements 
remain.5 Then, a full 30 percent of all OJT jobs are lost or left in the month 
following the termination of the contract. Following this stage, attrition 
once again becomes gradual, with another 21 percent of jobs being left 
over a nine-month period. When the findings graphed here are combined 
with an official "entered employment at termination" rate of 78 percent, 
we also learn that the great majority of jobs lost during the first month 
following the OJT contract were counted as program successes. Despite 
their simplicity, these findings speak unambiguously about the value of 
postprogram follow-ups and the way in which the OJT system at that time 
and place was working.
The final illustration of descriptive findings offered here comes from 
a small recent survey of OJT employers in one SDA. The figures here 
suffer a relatively large error margin since they are based on only 78 
interviews. However, employer responses were so extreme that the small 
numbers cannot obscure the basic thrust. Exhibit 3.5 reports one set of 
employer perceptions relevant to an interpretation of employer cost or 
benefit from participating in the JTPA OJT program. Aside from the 
wage subsidy OJT employers receive, the greatest cost or benefit they 
receive from participation in OJT is the work produced by the participant. 
If the participant is less skilled, slower to learn, less productive, or less
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tractable than normal non-OJT hires, the placement represents a cost. 
Indeed, the wage subsidy is supposed to offset such costs. For this reason, 
employers were asked to compare their OJT participants, at the point of 
their initial hire, with the typical non-OJT hire for the same position.
The results shown in exhibit 3.5 make clear that in this SDA, the great 
majority of employers perceive that they have benefited from hiring an 
OJT participant. Over 80 percent say their OJT hire is easier to supervise 
than other hires, and over 60 percent say the OJT hire is a more productive 
worker than non-OJT hires. The same pattern holds for all the specific 
ratings save one: 31 percent of employers report their OJT participant 
needed greater-than-average training, while only 11 percent say they 
needed less. Even here, in the area assumed by definition to represent a 
cost to OJT employers, the majority say OJT and non-OJT hires are 
identical.
This descriptive finding is chosen to illustrate both the value and the 
limits of descriptive findings. Program planners can feel assured of the
Exhibit 3.5
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satisfaction with which their OJT program is being greeted, can use these 
results in marketing OJT to other employers, and can rest assured that 
their assessment and assignment system is locating successful workers. 
Yet, they cannot know how much of this employer satisfaction stems 
from excellent matching of particular employer needs and particular 
participant strengths and weaknesses, how much from the general 
employment maturity, which is by policy required of all OJT partici 
pants, and how much from "over-selection" of the most employable 
individuals to be placed in OJT. Many policy implications depend on 
these alternatives, although some implications are clear in any event, 
such as the feasibility of reducing wage subsidy without inducing 
employer perceptions that OJT is too costly.
Minimal Research Design for a Participant Follow-Up Analysis
Whether analysis will remain descriptive or move on to differential 
impact, certain minimal research design requirements guide the proper 
collection of survey data. A large amount of literature is available on 
survey research methods (see especially Rossi, Wright, and Anderson 
1983; Dillman 1978). In this chapter, a set of topics that must be 
addressed by any client follow-up survey is listed with only brief 
comments on advisable design decisions for JTPA. A more extensive 
treatment of the design issues facing JTPA evaluations is found in 
Simpson (1986).
Identifying the Population to Be Analyzed
The first step in designing either a descriptive outcomes analysis or a 
differential impact analysis is deciding which set of participants to 
include that is, how to define the population under study, the popula 
tion to which conclusions will be generalized. In JTPA, the first such 
decision involves which authorizing titles are to be included. This choice 
depends primarily on managers' goals for the analysis. In addition, 
attention must be paid to the comparability of measures across title and 
to whether the programs operated under different titles are comparable 
enough to be combined meaningfully.
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The second decision regarding which population to study is whether 
the population should include the following: all of those found to be 
eligible for JTPA services, all of those who were enrolled in JTPA, all 
statuses at termination, or only participants who were employed at 
termination. Studying all eligibles would be required for a full analysis 
of selection into the program. However, for a descriptive analysis of 
gross outcomes or a differential impact analysis of the effects of program 
service or implementation variants, only participants receiving services 
need be included.
There is sometimes a temptation to reduce data collection costs by 
including in the study population only individuals who terminated with 
employment. However, there are several reasons why gross impact 
analysis designs should include all termination statuses in the popula 
tion to be studied.6 The only outcome that can be measured with a 
population limited to participants who were employed at termination is 
"retention of the termination job." Estimates of other standard outcome 
measures-average wage, proportion employed, etc. would be badly 
inflated by excluding the group least likely to be employed at follow- 
up those unemployed at termination. On the other hand, to estimate this 
group's follow-up employment and earnings at zero (their status at 
termination) would underestimate program success by ignoring delayed 
employment. Further, including all termination statuses allows the 
evaluation to examine why some individuals gain less than others from 
the program, insures comparability with cost data, and guards against 
differences in service providers' methods of defining termination status.
Deciding Whether Data Collection Should Be Longitudinal
In order to analyze change in employment, earnings, life satisfaction, 
and the like, the same individuals must be measured before and after the 
program intervention. In some situations, program eligibility data par 
tially satisfy this need by detailing work history as well as individual 
background characteristics. When these data constitute adequate prepro 
gram measures, an evaluation may be "added on" efficiently by identi 
fying a sample at the point of program termination and measuring 
postprogram outcomes parallel to the preprogram measures already 
available.
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A wide range of preprogram data may be informative concerning client 
characteristics. The important issue regarding the analysis of change is 
that the preprogram measures be similar enough to postprogram meas 
ures to be comparable. If the range of program outcomes is widened, 
additional preprogram measures may be required. However, pre- and 
postprogram measures need not be identical, as discussed later in this 
chapter.
Determining the Duration of the Study
While it would be convenient to concentrate data collection into a few 
months, this shortcut endangers the validity of the research, introducing 
known biases and others less easy to identify. The population to be 
studied should, therefore, be defined to include all enrollees or terminees 
throughout the full year.
This definition prevents bias due to seasonal variations in the labor 
market. Similarly, in classroom training, some institutions tend to end 
courses during particular months, so that the proportion of terminees who 
are program completers vs. those who are dropouts varies monthly. 
Third, different service providers develop different policies concerning 
when to commit their funds, in total or for particular services, and how 
long to hold unsuccessful participants before terminating them when 
required to by the expiration of agency contract periods. All these factors 
produce seasonal differences in the likelihood of program success.
Defining the Size of the Study Sample
Once a population is selected for analysis, the question becomes how 
large a sample should be in order for calculations to estimate accurately 
the patterns within the entire participant population. Assuming a repre 
sentative sample, the primary determinant of error margin (i.e., of the 
accuracy of conclusions) is the number of cases upon which estimates are 
based. A conclusion that one program variant has 10 percent higher 
retention rate than another means little if the margin of error for that 
estimate is 20 percent. Therefore, the first decision must be how many 
cases are needed in order to generate a level of error acceptable to those 
who will use the analysis results.
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One essential reason that survey research has become such a widely 
used method is that the accuracy of estimates rises rapidly as we move 
from very small samples to samples of modest size; yet, samples of 
modest size are nearly as accurate as very large samples. This occurs 
because error decreases as a function of the square root of the sample size. 
More precisely, the estimated error associated with any measure depends 
on the standard error of that measure. For random samples, the standard 
error equals the standard deviation of the measure divided by the square 
root of the sample size (i.e., se = sd+ sqrtN). Thus, if an income measure 
has a standard deviation of $4,000, the standard error is about $800 with 
a sample of 25, $400 with a sample of 100, $200 with a sample of 400, 
and $100 with a sample of 1,600.
One can see the danger of relying on a very small sample. However, it 
is equally evident that the marginal improvement from each increase in 
sample size is quickly reduced as sample size becomes larger. In the 
example above, adding 375 to a sample of 25 reduces error by $600, from 
$800 to $200. However, another 1,200 cases would be required to trim 
a further $100 off the standard error.
This phenomenon explains why many state and local surveys with 
limited funds choose sample sizes in the range of 350-500. Efficiency 
(accuracy gained per increase in data collection cost) rises rapidly below 
that level, but more slowly afterward. In addition, when percentages 
(e.g., percent "yes") are reported, samples in this size range produce error 
margins at or under 5 percent, a round number and error margin typically 
satisfactory for most purposes. However, sample size decisions should 
always be made after analysis goals are clearly established.- Planners 
will be well-advised to consult one of several thorough texts on sampling 
(e.g., Kish 1965; Sudman 1976) or to employ a sampling specialist in 
cases where sampling appears problematic or in order to determine the 
most cost-efficient sample.7
One additional consideration must be included in planning sample 
size: not all members of the initial sample selected will be contacted. 
Therefore, the number of specific individuals selected for inclusion in the 
sample must be greater than the number of completed interviews desired. 
The number to be selected is calculated by dividing the desired number
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of completed interviews by the planned survey completion rate. For 
example, to complete 400 interviews at a completion rate of 70 percent 
would require that 571 names be identified in the initial sample (400 -*  0.7).
Stratifying Samples
Populations are sometimes divided into subgroups, or strata, each of 
which is sampled separately. Strata may be sampled in proportion to their 
numbers in the population, or disproportionately. Although some believe 
that samples must be proportionately stratified to insure the proper 
number of members with various background characteristics, this belief 
is in error. Proper sampling procedures insure a representative sample. 
No reason exists to consider proportionate stratification in gross impact 
analysis.
There are several conditions under which disproportionately stratified 
samples are sometimes recommended (Sudman 1976). Only one of these 
is applicable to gross impact analysis, but that one reason is central to 
statewide differential impact analysis as well as to analyses of subcon 
tractor performance within large SDAs. The need for disproportionate 
stratification of gross impact samples arises when the analyst's emphasis 
is on comparing or reliably characterizing subpopulations rather than on 
characterizing the entire population of participants. This occurs in the 
case of JTPA postprogram performance standards, where welfare recipi 
ents are treated as a separate stratum. In addition, statewide analysis 
aimed toward comparisons among SDAs, or SDA-level analysis com 
paring service providers, should consider stratifying to insure reliable 
characterization of smaller units. For such comparisons, the operative 
issue is not total sample size, but sample size for each subunit being 
compared with any other.
Identifying Members of the Sample
The sample of participants who are interviewed must be representative 
of the population being studied; i.e., each element of the population must 
have an equal chance to be included in the sample. None of the claims for 
sample efficiency or reliability holds when samples are not representa 
tive. Sample selection procedures must guarantee equal probability of
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inclusion, eliminating any purposeful or accidental selection. The only 
way to guarantee equal probability of inclusion is to select from the 
population into the sample at random. The classical approach is to select 
each individual from an ordered list, using a table of random numbers. 
Two, more convenient methods, however, are equally valid.
First, the last three digits of participants' social security numbers are 
random with respect to any meaningful characteristic of individuals. 
Therefore, sample members may be selected by identifying a range of 
three-digit numbers that would produce the required sample size, and 
including all participants with numbers falling in that range. If, for 
example, 25 percent of the names are to be sampled, the lower end of the 
range is chosen at random, and the upper is set at 250 higher. The second 
method is systematic sampling based on a random start. If 25 percent of 
the population is to be sampled, a list of names, typically a computer file, 
is prepared. One of the first four is chosen at random, and then every 
fourth name is included in the sample.
Participants may be selected into the sample at either program entry or 
termination, as long as the full population of participants is available for 
the sample. From the practical research administration viewpoint, it is 
often preferable to identify the sample at termination. However, if the 
data collection plan requires the addition of individual treatment meas 
ures throughout the program, it would be most efficient to identify 
participants for inclusion in the analysis upon entry. At that point, they 
could be specially tagged for collection of individual treatment data and 
inclusion in the postprogram follow-up.
Establishing a Follow-Up Period for 
Measuring Postprogram Outcomes
In addition to outcomes measured at program termination, postpro 
gram outcomes are especially valuable for assessing program quality. In 
the case of JTPA, a three-month follow-up is required, making that 
period the obvious choice for a first, and perhaps only, follow-up. The 
majority of any survey costs occurs before the first question is asked  
recording locater information, identifying a sample, keeping records on 
that sample, tracking hard-to-locate former participants, hiring and
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training interviewers, setting up interview phone banks, making multiple 
calls to locate the participant, and introducing the purpose of the call. 
Therefore, the most efficient design is to add questions to a pre-existing 
survey.
In addition, the issue of selecting a follow-up period should be 
examined on its own merits. The major question is whether three months 
is too short a follow-up lag period. Factors weigh on both sides of the 
question.
There is value in extending the follow-up time period. Recent studies 
testing how well various follow-up measures predict long-term net 
impact of JTPA find three-month follow-ups much stronger than termi 
nation data alone, six-month follow-ups stronger than those at three 
months, and nine-month periods stronger than those at six months 
(Geraci 1984; Zornitsky et al. 1985). While the gain from each additional 
delay is smaller than the one before, each does offer improved validity.
Costs are also involved in extending the follow-up period. Follow-up 
surveys are subject to serious sample attrition if the first or only 
interviews are conducted very long after termination. Since sample 
attrition introduces unknown biases, it is preferable to conduct shorter- 
term follow-ups and achieve higher completion rates. In addition, a 
three-month follow-up is minimally acceptable. That delay is long 
enough to allow the rate of employment after classroom training to 
stabilize. It is also long enough for OJT placement to stabilize after the 
postcontract drop-off, even where 30-day delayed performance pay 
ments may delay that drop-off. Three months is also long enough to 
eliminate most inconsistencies introduced by the tendencies of some 
service providers to make more extensive use than others of the "admin 
istrative hold for job search assistance" category following the program.
Given the costs and inefficiencies of long-term follow-up surveys, 
states or SDAs planning to do longer-term follow-up may wish to 
consider using unemployment insurance (UI) wage records if they are 
available. Once access to the UI data base is established, a one- or even 
two-year follow-up is as easy to perform as a six-month follow-up. (UI 
system use is detailed by Johnson and Stromsdorfer in chapter 2 of this 
volume.) One factor, however, limits the usefulness of these data as a
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gross impact measure: UI data cover only individuals who maintain 
residence within the state. In the net impact approach, movement out of 
state is assumed to be equivalent for treated and untreated groups. 
However, gross outcomes are measured only for participants, making 
movement out of state a serious problem. One cannot determine whether 
a record of zero earnings represents continuous unemployment or move 
ment out of the state. Use of this approach is recommended only if a 
separate tracking effort to estimate the proportion who moved out of 
the UI reporting area is mounted for those individuals with zero UI 
income. That estimate could then be used to adjust estimated job 
retention rates.
Choosing the Data Collection Method
Gross impact analysis involves data collection through follow-up 
surveys of participants and employers. The rapid expansion of the survey 
research industry has been accompanied by a growing literature on how 
to conduct surveys, the strengths and weaknesses of surveys, and the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of in-person interviews, mail ques 
tionnaires, and phone interviews (e.g., Dillman 1978; Rossi, Wright, and 
Anderson 1983). Survey research technology will not be detailed here; 
it will suffice to make the following summary claims:
1. Correctly conducted, surveys have proven highly reliable.
2. Surveys suffer much less response bias than once feared, as long as 
the respondent believes the interviews are conducted by a neutral 
party,8 and interviewers converse in a natural style (Bradburn 1983).
3. Bias from nonresponse can be problematic, but can be guarded 
against by achieving relatively high response rates and either insur 
ing relatively equal response rates from all key subgroups or statis 
tically adjusting subgroup response rates during analysis.
4. Given the cost of in-person interviews and the high nonresponse rate 
and possible educational bias in response with mail questionnaires, 
phone surveys are usually recommended for program evaluation.
Conclusions Concerning Design
When the research design decisions just discussed have been made, the
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basic structure of the evaluation effort is in place. These issues have been 
touched on only briefly, as they are so basic. However, detailed treat 
ments are available in various standard texts (e.g., Rossi and Freeman 
1982), making further comment here unnecessary.
Differential Impact Analysis:
Estimating Influences on Program Outcomes
The primary goal of differential impact analysis is to reliably describe 
differences in postprogram outcomes across program services and forms 
of service delivery implementation, so as to identify the probable causes 
of those differences. In nonexperimental research, identifying causal 
relationships is problematic. However, quasi-experimental research 
designs, such as those recommended by Campbell and Stanley (1966), 
can considerably increase our confidence in having reliably identified 
the major causes of differences we observe. (See also Campbell and 
Cook 1979; Caporaso and Roos 1973.) For purposes of program 
development, managers will wish to gain information about the differen 
tial effectiveness of program variants—options available to managers in 
the services assigned to individuals and in forms of program implemen 
tation. These variants may be altered on the basis of evaluation findings 
in order to improve program effectiveness.
Formal, quantitative differential impact analysis is a relatively under 
developed field, as is well-illustrated in Borus's (1979) program evalu 
ation primer. After listing 44 specific participant characteristics known 
to affect labor market success, he turns to the question of "program 
component independent variables." His one-paragraph discussion of 
this topic begins by saying that "It would be extremely useful in 
modifying existing programs and in the planning of new programs to 
know which of the (program) components is most effective for various 
types of participants" (Borus 1979, p. 70). Two measures are suggested: 
program length,"... and, if possible, a measure of quality." A review of 
previous studies using a differential impact analysis approach to evalu 
ating job training programs is included in Simpson (1986).
Identifying probable causal connections is valuable to program man 
agers because changing a factor that has a causal influence on program
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outcomes is likely to change the level of those outcomes. While formal 
causal modeling may seem the domain of esoteric social science, it is 
essential to research on the basis of which investment decisions may be 
made. Let us suppose that a weak analysis confirms higher success rates 
among individuals who receive shorter intake procedures and concludes 
that brief intake causes improved program performance. Let us further 
assume that a more solid causal analysis would have learned that the most 
highly employable participants entering the system were given brief 
intake because they had little need, and that it was their employability 
rather than the intake that affected their postprogram success. Ironically, 
if an SDA were to base decisions on such weak research and overhaul its 
intake system to offer only short intake, its performance would not 
improve and might deteriorate, because those participants who needed, 
and previously received, the longest intake no longer have that opportunity.
The goal of each of the steps involved in differential impact analysis 
is to increase our confidence that we have identified those program 
variants that do have a direct influence on program outcomes and are 
therefore useful to program managers in improving their programs. This 
chapter can only summarize some major characteristics of nonexperi- 
mental research designed to increase the analyst's ability to identify 
causal relationships. There are also useful references available on this 
complex subject (e.g., Blalock 1964; 1985).
Research into causal relationships begins with comparisons. To deter 
mine whether program option A is better than option B, one must identify 
a criterion of comparison (e.g., job retention) and compare options A and 
B on that dimension. Options could be basic program activities, such as 
OJT, classroom training, or work experience, or optional variants within 
the same activity, such as OJT assignments developed by the participant, 
developed by the service provider, or initiated by an employer. These 
comparisons should be selected so that a causal interpretation is reason 
able. This is where past research findings, economic theory, and manag 
ers' knowledge of programs come into play. If answering a question in 
causal terms would fly in the face of logic or of established information, 
the question probably should not be posed as part of a differential impact 
analysis.
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In addition, to convincingly establish that a relationship is causal, 
findings from our comparisons must hold up after competing explana 
tions have been eliminated. Each time we identify a plausible competing 
explanation, test it, and find that it does not explain away the difference 
between options A and B, we increase our confidence in the causal 
association between program variant A/B and the outcome in question. 
For example, our confidence in finding that public classroom trainers 
perform better than proprietary trainers (or the reverse) would be 
increased by learning that the difference in performance could not be 
accounted for by differences in participants' literacy skills or prior job 
experience, by differences in the fields for which each type of school 
trained participants, etc.
The goal of quasi-experimental research is to eliminate the effects of 
all important measurable alternative explanations. That goal is never 
reached, but we can eliminate many important alternative explanations. 
These include both factors of interest to the analyst, such as other 
program variants confounded with the one being tested, and control 
variables, such as age or gender, known to affect the outcome in 
question.
Classical experiments attempt to eliminate competing explanations by 
controlling variants other than the A/B comparison of interest and by 
randomly assigning individuals to variants A and B, hoping thereby to 
produce groups equivalent in all regards except for the variant under 
study. Quasi-experimental research occurs in settings that allow neither 
the control of variants other than those directly under study nor the 
random assignment of participants to program variants. Instead, multi- 
variate statistical techniques are used to determine whether alternative 
explanations are able to undermine our confidence in findings.
The primary strategy of differential impact analysis is to utilize each 
program variant as a comparison group for each other variant. Except 
where program variants are too highly correlated with each other or with 
participant background characteristics, multivariate analysis can esti 
mate the unique effects of each. This same approach has guided recent 
research on the impact of college (Astin 1977). In the case of college 
impact, no untreated comparison group exists, making net impact studies
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impossible. However, comparisons among colleges, with each acting as 
comparison group for the other, are possible given careful measurement 
of differential selection into each college. The same logic applies to 
differential impact analysis, where the decision is made to structure 
research that cannot ask net impact questions but which can, nonetheless, 
reliably compare different treatments and treatment contexts.
Combating Bias That Threatens the 
Validity of Differential Impact Analysis
The comparisons demanded by the analysis goals and the data collec 
tion method surveys in this case determine the major threats to the 
validity of differential impact analysis. These risks are summarized 
below. Each is a source of bias, as opposed to random error. The term 
bias refers to error that consistently misdirects research results. Like a 
compass with a metal object nearby, readings from the analysis are 
distorted in a consistent direction. To correct the findings, one must 
remove the object or adjust for its influence. Random error differs from 
bias in that it takes no particular direction. Random error can be as serious 
as bias if it is large. However, techniques for minimizing random error 
are well-developed in survey research (i.e., careful measurement tech 
niques and properly constituted samples).
Some types of bias can also be dealt with through standard survey 
research techniques. These include bias from censored samples, nonre- 
sponse bias, and response bias. They can be prevented by selecting 
samples correctly, achieving high response rates across all major groups 
in the sample, and wording questions properly. The two types of bias 
defined in exhibit 3.6, selection bias and bias from confounded program 
variants, are combated during multivariate analysis. This means that 
descriptive gross outcomes analysis, which does not employ multivari 
ate techniques, is always subject to serious bias. Differential impact 
analysis is able to reduce, but not eliminate, these biases during analysis.
Bias is reduced when equations include measures indicating selectiv 
ity and program variants that overlap with the program variant being 
tested. However, many selection biases are unknown or cannot be 
measured, making statistical adjustments difficult. Therefore, selection
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Exhibit 3.6
Two Types of Bias Especially Problematic 
to Differential Impact Research
Selection Bias
When participants who selectorare selected into different program variants differ in ways that affect 
program outcomes, observed outcome differences between program variants could be produced 
either by program qualities or by participant characteristics If participant characteristics are not taken 
into account, estimates of program impact will be biased. For example, preprogram employment 
experience influences postprogram employabihty and may also influence which program service is 
assigned If employment history is not measured, the analyst cannot adjust for its impact on 
postprogram outcomes, producing biased estimates of the differential impact of service assignment. 
Since many such differences may exist but not be measurable (e g , subjective motivation), some 
degree of selection bias is always present in differential impact analysis
Confounded Program Variants
When two program variants are correlated with each other, the unique effects of each can be 
estimated if both are included in the same equation. However, if one is omitted, then the estimate for 
the included variant will absorb the effect of the omitted one, biasing conclusions in that direction. For 
example, if in a particular service delivery system, service providers who exercise especially careful 
quality control over employer sites acceptable for OJT assignments also conduct more elaborate intake 
assessment of job maturity prior to OJT assignment, and if both of these improve OJT postprogram 
outcomes, then both must be included in the analysis, or the estimated impact of either one alone will 
be inflated
bias is the most serious analytical problem as well as the most difficult to 
diagnose.
Minimizing Bias from Nonrandom Selection
Reducing the effects of selection bias follows the general logic of 
causal analysis. Each source of selection bias is an alternative explana 
tion that can be countered only by inclusion in multivariate equations of 
variables which identify the selection process. The discussion below 
identifies four major sources of selection bias. For each, the aspects of 
differential impact analysis most likely to be affected and the measure 
ment strategies most able to minimize the bias are indicated.
Sources of Selection Bias
1. Legally eligible individuals may or may not apply to JTPA because 
of differences in information available, personality or motivational 
differences or geographical differences in services available. This se 
lection process is critical for net impact studies, but seldom biases 
differential impact analysis, which involve only comparisons among 
individuals already enrolled in JTPA. However, if this type of bias
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differs across SDAs, then statewide differential impact comparisons 
among SDAs will be affected.
Little protection from this type of bias is available to analysis that 
does not include an untreated comparison group. However, SDA- 
level measures of program availability and participant measures of 
motivation for applying to JTPA may help assess possible differ 
ences between SDAs. In addition, standard demographic back 
ground characteristics may be correlated with motivational charac 
teristics, allowing their inclusion in differential impact analysis to 
act as a partial proxy for direct measures of motivation.
2. Participants may or may not be enrolled into JTPA after eligibility 
is determined. If the reasons are correlated with program outcomes, 
bias will result. The source of this type of selection may be program 
policies and practices such as targeting, a participant's choice after 
learning of program options, or failure to locate a program placement 
of the type decided on for that participant.
Measuring the source and nature of the selection is the appropriate 
tool for reducing bias from these sources. It is possible to measure 
implementation policies such as targeting, which are intended to 
determine which eligible individuals are enrolled. In addition, 
measures of participants' demographic and work history character 
istics may act as a proxy for agency selection or may indicate which 
participants best fit the agency's desired targets. Beyond that, the key 
measures of agency selection involve the proportion of eligibles for 
each provider who fail to enroll and the reasons why they have made 
that choice. Given some JTPA managers' reported emphasis on 
enrolling the most qualified participants, statewide differential impact 
analysis will be well-advised to include agency-level measures of 
intended and, where possible, actual selectivity by service providers.
3. Participants may request a particular treatment aside from the 
decision to enroll in JTPA. If the reasons for that request also predict 
that participant's likely program outcome, this self-selection can 
bias estimates of how program activity affects outcomes. This is 
especially likely to occur where employers select desirable job 
applicants and then send them to JTPA to request OJT enrollment,
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or where schools send their best students to JTPA for support to 
complete a program. Participant requests are most likely to involve 
a basic program activity, or a particular school or employer. Analysis 
comparing these most basic treatment variants is, therefore, the most 
likely to suffer from this source of bias.
The best protection against bias from self-selected treatment is 
measuring participants' route into JTPA: whether they requested 
particular services, and if so, which ones and why. In particular, the 
route from employer or school to JTPA should be identified, since it 
involves a type of self-selection most likely to affect postprogram 
success. One could also measure the degree to which particular 
service providers control the assignment to treatment vs. allowing 
participants to elect their own treatment.
4. Participants may also be assigned to particular treatments by pro 
gram managers. If treatment A rather than treatment B is assigned on 
the basis of factors that also influence program outcome, selection 
bias is present.
This source of bias has potentially pervasive effects on differential 
impact analysis because rational service provider policy offers the 
most intensive services to those with the greatest need. That is, many 
JTPA services are intentionally compensatory. Since "greatest need" 
often translates to "least employable," the selection of services on the 
basis of need can bias estimates of treatment impacts on employment 
outcomes in studies that do not include measures of need in the 
analysis. To identify compensatory effects of treatment, one must 
have measures of both the need and the treatment. Since these two 
factors have opposite effects, they cancel each other out and neither 
effect is visible without joint analysis of both variables.
Measurement Approaches to Combat Selection Bias 
When differential selection cannot be prevented, it must be identified 
by measuring the selection process and decisions. Differential impact 
analysis has the advantage of attacking from two different angles, using 
individual-level measures of preprogram characteristics and of the 
selection process experienced by each individual participant, and also 
employing agency-level implementation measures of selection policies
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and typical practices. Individual-level measures have several advantages 
for combating bias:
1. Ideally, they can include the agency's diagnosis of each participant's 
need and its service prescription for each participant as well as the 
treatment each individual actually received. Both the participant's 
true level of need and the agency's perception of each participant's 
need are important potential sources of selection bias.
2. They offer information on the explicit selection process by the JTPA 
agency. For example, we can learn how much intake time the agency 
spent with each particular participant. It is one thing to know what 
"full" intake includes (an agency-level measure) and another to 
know that individual A received only a "fast track" intake review, 
while individual B was judged to require extensive pre-employment 
services.
3. They can include the route each specific individual takes into 
training. This proves to be one primary indicator of selection bias.
4. They allow precise measurement of program variants, increasing the 
power of the measures most important to any differential impact 
analysis.
Agency-level variables also exhibit two particular strengths in com 
bating selection bias.
1. The problem of compensatory treatment cannot be fully solved by 
individual-level measures, because no precise measures of need or 
assistance exist. Agency-level measures indicate resources avail 
able or provided on average. They are, therefore, much less influ 
enced by compensatory treatment. For example, if agency A pro 
vides job search assistance to only 5 percent of clients while agency
2. B does so for 40 percent, it is almost certain that many individuals of 
equal need will receive this service in agency B but not in agency A. 
Agency policies directly affect selection. Targeting decisions, pol 
icy toward "creaming," policies regarding single vs. multiple activ 
ity treatments, and the like, have some consistent effect on selection 
across all participants enrolled through a particular agency. Such 
agency policies can indicate selection on difficult-to-measure crite 
ria such as how participants present themselves interpersonally.
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The Potential for Severe Bias in
Analyses of the Most Basic Program Divisions
Perhaps the two most basic program divisions managers might wish to 
analyze using the differential impact analysis approach are different 
service providers within a service delivery system and different program 
activity assignments. Unhappily, these divisions are the most likely to be 
affected by selection bias as well as by bias from confounded program 
variants. Implementation policies vary most widely across service pro 
viders and across basic program services. Service providers are likely to 
want control over which participants are assigned to each basic service. 
Similarly, participants are more likely to exercise choice regarding 
preferred basic services than about more specific implementation poli 
cies. Service provider implementation and service mix involve basic 
resource allocation decisions and are, therefore, likely to be affected by 
geopolitical concerns.
Different Service Providers
SDAs, and to a smaller extent their subcontractors, are located in 
different labor markets and political atmospheres. Although one can 
account for some of these differences through measures of the labor 
market environment and agency policies, many will remain unmeasured. 
Therefore, some unknown degree of bias will persist in analysis across 
service providers, especially SDAs. The fuller and more accurate the 
measures of labor market environment and agency policies concerning 
recruitment and selection, the smaller the remaining bias.
Basic Program Activities
Basic service treatment options are designed, in part, to accommodate 
differences in participant needs and qualifications. In particular, job 
search assistance assumes job readiness, OJT assumes minimum ac 
ceptability to employers, and work experience assumes an absence of 
even the most basic job experience. Selection bias is likely to be 
especially serious in such cases, because differential selection on the 
basis of employability is explicitly called for. In addition, different 
treatments produce outcomes through different mechanisms, making
Evaluating Gross Program Outcomes 171
them complex to compare directly. For example, true training interven 
tions are intended to produce skill transfer and employment, leading to 
a career line. These outcomes have little relevance, however, for an 
intervention based on securing employment through the leverage of a 
payment made to employers.
These concerns lead to the recommendation that (where resources 
allow) sample size should be large enough to accommodate separate 
analysis within each basic activity, along with tests performed across all 
activities. In addition, differential impact analysis should include 
"membership-identifier" variables indicating enrollment in each of the 
most common program activities and in each SDA included in an 
analysis. These variables will absorb the effects of basic program activity 
and also some unmeasured selection effects, thereby reducing bias in 
estimates of other effects.
Although these problems appear overwhelming, and are never solved 
completely, each additional measure of selection improves estimates. 
The analyst, therefore, has the power to produce highly useful and quite 
accurate estimates, which should, nevertheless, always be interpreted as 
imperfect. Simpson's (1989) analysis of one SDA illustrates the value of 
measuring selection into program activities. Without controls, it ap 
peared that enrolling participants in multiple-sequenced activities pro 
duced only a slight improvement in job retention at 13 weeks. However, 
after including in the analysis a set of competency benchmarks measured 
at program entry, a large benefit became observable for those enrolled in 
sequenced activities. These competencies had been used as a basis for 
assigning multiple services, so that participants with greatest need 
received most intensive treatment. These two factors tended to cancel 
each other out, so that the effects of each could be observed only when 
both were included in the equation.
Measuring Potential Influences on Outcomes
Differential impact analysis tests the impact of program variants and 
control variables on postprogram outcomes. In particular, managers may 
test whether particular forms of implementation produce greater or lesser 
success and whether assignment to particular program services or to
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services with particular qualities improves an individual's chances of 
experiencing postprogram success. Basic categories of factors may be 
tested to examine their possible impact on these outcomes. They are 
shown in exhibit 3.7.
As discussed earlier, the analysis of how program implementation and 
treatment influence outcomes is one of the most neglected areas of
Exhibit 3.7
Types of Factors to be Tested as Possible Determinants 
of Program Outcomes, with Examples






























• Form of contracting used 
• Program cost 
• Size of program
• Targeting (selection) policies 
• Typical intake procedures 
• Quality control procedures 
• Exit practices
• Basic service assigned to (OJT, CT, etc.) 
• Service provider enrolled through
• Intake screening intensity or method 
• Treatment intensity (length, complexity) 
• Characteristics of the trainer 
• Job search assistance received
• Age 
• Employment history 
• Educational attainment
• Indicators of "creaming" 
• Referrals involving prescreenmg
• Unemployment rates across place/time 
• Median wage across place/time
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research in employment and training. Implementation studies do not 
include estimates of impact on outcomes. Outcome studies typically 
work with the very limited base of treatment measures derived from 
accessible agency records. This means the thoughtful measurement of 
program variants is the key to creative advances in program development 
based on differential impact analysis.
Of the factors shown in exhibit 3.7, those labeled "program variants" 
are identified by choice, because the analyst hopes to learn whether 
particular implementation forms or particular individual services en 
hance program outcomes. Program variants include the basic organiza 
tional arrangements and the service delivery framework established to 
implement delivery of services, and the specific treatment received by 
each participant. Treatment includes both variable descriptions of the 
services received, such as the length of a training program, and measures 
identifying only whether or not a participant was a member of some 
particular set, such as recipient of classroom training or enrollee through 
a particular service provider.9 A third set of factors, "control variables," 
is required in order to insure that effects estimated for program variants 
are as accurate as possible. These measure participant background, 
selection processes, labor market qualities, etc. When these are analyzed 
together, it becomes possible to isolate estimates of the unique effects of 
each on a given program outcome.
The conceptualization phase of measuring treatment and implementa 
tion is critical. The criteria summarized in exhibit 3.8 offer some guid 
ance. Criteria 1 and 6 are essentially technical, and may be honored 
without much knowledge of JTPA. However, criteria 2 through 5 require 
knowledge of the state or local JTPA service delivery system, making 
input from program managers critical to successful analysis. As a general 
principle, differential impact analysis becomes useful to guide program 
development only when measures are developed in collaboration be 
tween researchers and program directors. Measures are also suggested 
by JTPA implementation studies (reviewed by Grembowski, chapter 2 
in this volume) and some excellent analyses of CETA implementation 
(Levitan and Mangum 1981; Snedeker and Snedeker 1973; Franklin and 
Ripley 1984).
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Exhibit 3.8
Criteria Useful When Selecting Implementation 
or Treatment Variables for Analysis
1 Can the variable be measured reliably?
2. Is there reason to believe it varies across individuals or service providers?
3 Is there reason to believe it represents a nontnvial program impact?
4. Does the variable measure a program variant under the control of program managers; that is, 
is it a policy-relevant variable?
5. Are program managers open to changing the program variant to be measured?
6. Given cost and time constraints, can the measure be integrated into a data collection scheme?
Service Provider Surveys to Measure 
Program Implementation Variants
In exhibit 3.7, the first sets of measures characterize program implem 
entation aspects of the organizations put in place to provide JTPA 
services. These measures characterize the entire organization its struc 
ture, policies, and practices rather than any one participant's treatment. 
Most program implementation variants are best measured through sur 
veys of service-providing organizations. Data for each service provider 
can then be attached to the computer files of all participants who enrolled 
through that provider. In this way, data collected inexpensively by 
surveying a limited number of service providers can be used to analyze 
program impacts on all individual participants in the sample.
Depending on the nature of the measures, agency directors may be able 
to answer reliably, or agency staff may need to compare notes or consult 
records in order to characterize typical practices accurately. With easy- 
to-answer questions, phone surveys may be used. For more demanding 
measures, however, a written survey, which allows time for data gather 
ing, is preferable. The recommendation here is to use a written survey of 
each service-providing organization, with a backup telephone contact 
person who can clarify questions as they arise.
One problem with service provider surveys is that agencies may intend 
one form of implementation but actually carry out another, making self- 
descriptions inaccurate. This can be partially remedied by a second form 
of implementation measurement: aggregated agency characteristics.
Evaluating Gross Program Outcomes 175
Aggregated variables are measured with the individual participant as unit 
and then summed, percentaged, or averaged across all participants within 
each agency. For example, agency surveys could report whether policies 
emphasize training women for nontraditional occupations. The aggre 
gated form of measurement for this same issue begins by constructing the 
individual-level variable. Nontraditional training fields for women are 
identified, and the training field of each female participant in the sample 
is coded as traditional or nontraditional. That individual variable is then 
aggregated for each agency, producing an agency-level variable, "per 
cent of female participants trained in nontraditional fields," which may 
be used to double-check agency reports.
Suggested Measures of Program Implementation
Program implementation variants can be divided into basic organiza 
tional components, such as forms of contracting and staffing, and service 
delivery framework within which intake, service assignment, provision 
of basic services and support services, and program exit occur. The latter 
are most likely to have a direct influence on program outcomes, because 
they affect the nature of services provided and the selection process 
through which individuals are assigned to treatments. Yet basic organ 
izational components are inexpensive to measure and may influence 
outcomes indirectly, by affecting various aspects of the service delivery 
framework. They are also important as control variables, to protect 
interpretations from alternative explanations after the research is 
completed.
Basic Organizational Composition
Forms of contracting. SDAs may or may not use requests for proposals 
(RFPs) as part of the subcontracting process. For both service provider 
contracts and trainer referral contracts, use of fixed-price, performance- 
based contracts may be contrasted with other approaches to contracting.
Staff qualifications. Franklin and Ripley (1984) argue strongly that 
staff qualifications represent a key to success, although they are not 
specific about what constitutes good qualifications.
Staff turnover. One might assume that staff stability (low turnover)
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would predict success, although during the late CETA era, one study 
found the reverse to be true (Simpson 1984a).
Staff workload and division of labor. Client-to-staff ratio, ongoing 
staff training, and the division of staff between direct service, administra 
tion, and development work can influence intensity and effectiveness of 
service delivery and, therefore, client outcomes.
Service provider history. The age of service providers, how much their 
services have changed over time, their relations with the private and 
public sectors, and their rate of growth or decline may be useful to 
identify, although JTPA implementation studies suggest these factors 
have little differential impact on program outcomes.
Size. The size of SDAs or subcontractors (amount of grant, number of 
participants, size of staff) may also be included as control variables.
Program costs and cost-related policies. Program costs are usually 
very difficult to measure precisely for individuals or for specific services. 
However, total cost-per-participant can be measured as an implementa 
tion variable, and analyzed either as outcome or as one possible influence 
on outcomes, when different SDAs or different service providers are 
being compared. In addition, policies toward use of support services, rate 
of employer reimbursement, and length of training can be measured. 
Aggregated measures, such as the proportion of participants receiving 
support services or the average length of OJTs, may also be useful.
Service Delivery Framework
Many of the same factors Grembowski poses as key to understanding 
organizational process (see chapter 4) are also valuable measures of 
program implementation for differential impact analysis. These may 
serve as program variants or as controls against bias.
Explicit selection processes. Agency selection is critical to measure, 
both as a service quality issue and also because selection bias can be 
partially addressed with such measures. Agency policy may emphasize 
enrolling the most job-ready, those with greatest need, or those whom the 
program is most likely to benefit. Agency selection policy may reserve 
some activities, such as short OJTs, primarily for those who are most 
easily served. A greater or smaller proportion of participants may have
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been referred initially by employers or schools, adding an issue of 
preselection.
Intake procedures. Procedures used during intake for selection, diag 
nosis, information giving, and counseling may differ in intensity and 
type. They may affect how well the agency treatments match the abilities 
and needs of each participant to the labor market. They may also act as 
indicators of the agency selection process.
Possible measures include length and intensity of typical intake; 
proportion of participants who get full intake; number of "hurdles" 
participants must pass, as an indicator of selection for motivation; 
whether intake is centralized or conducted by subcontractors; whether 
intake is conducted individually or in groups; what diagnostic tools are 
available and how often various tools are used, policies regarding 
targeting and other screening criteria; and what proportion of placements 
with employers were initiated by the employers.
Quality control over referral and program activity mix. Service pro 
viders may exercise strict control over the development of participant 
assignments, including rigorous screening of schools, agencies, or 
employers involved in treatment, or they may take the laissez faire 
approach, offering information and encouraging participants' self-di 
rected search for assignments, but exercising little control. This issue 
promises to be one of the most valuable areas for agency-level measure 
ment, because referral represents the pivotal point of agency influence 
over treatment.
Possible measures of agency control include whether employer refer 
rals are encouraged, giving control to employers, or carefully reviewed 
and screened, retaining agency control; whether policy encourages 
"open contract" referral arrangements, whereby employers agree to fill 
all openings for certain job titles by choosing among a set of eligibles sent 
for review by JTPA, giving service providers great control; whether the 
agency conducts formal quality reviews of employer-trainers or class 
room-trainers, increasing control; and whether a large proportion of 
assignments are developed through participants' self-directed search, 
which decreases agency control.
The second half of the quality control issue is how quality is defined.
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Among those agencies that perform explicit quality control reviews over 
potential referrals or placements, what criteria are used to define 
quality? Some possible measures include the following: previous JTPA 
placement or retention track record, if applicable; in the case of em 
ployer-based interventions, employer stability or growth, typical non- 
JTPA turnover rates, typical wage rates, amount and quality of training 
likely to occur in OJT assignments, employer's ability to supervise con 
structively; in the case of schools or community-based trainers, staff 
quality, ability to handle special student needs, placement assistance for 
graduates, and credibility among employers.
Exit practices. The final element of treatment is the set of program 
completion and job search options implemented. Exit practices are 
especially important to measure at the agency level. Individual measures 
of job search assistance suffer from the compensation problem: those 
least able to locate jobs on their own are most likely to receive job search 
assistance, creating the appearance that postprogram employment is 
negatively correlated with receipt of job search assistance. Agency-level 
measures of the average availability of assistance are not affected by the 
compensation problem. Measures may include availability of job clubs 
or job search workshops, proportion of staff time devoted to postprogram 
job development, proportion of trainers who include formal job place 
ment assistance, and method of placement, i.e., centralized or handled by 
subcontractors.
Individual Measures of Treatment Variants
The nature and intensity of services received by different participants 
in a program vary widely within service providers as well as between 
them. These differences among individual experiences require individ 
ual level measurement. In addition, individual-level measures offer 
several advantages, as listed in exhibit 3.9.
Some individuals' treatment experiences are routinely recorded as part 
of agency MIS files. Others may be recorded by agency staff as the 
treatments occur, or may be included in participant follow-up surveys, 
measured through participants' recall of the services they received. The 
preferable form of measurement is agency recording. Agency staff can
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Exhibit 3.9 
Major Advantages of Individual Level Measures
They tie program services to outcomes for the same specific individuals, offering precise analysis 
of the degree of association between the two
They tie specific services and outcomes to specific individual background characteristics, providing 
direct tests of control variables
Normally, they vary more widely than agency level measures, strengthening statistical tests
Normally, they suffer less overlap with other test variables than agency level measures, 
strengthening statistical tests.
record services as they occur, avoiding recall errors, and including 
sequence. Staff are also more able than participants to identify which 
services are administered. Agency measurement is also less expensive, 
as measured in terms of dollars, since it avoids telephone interview time. 
It is, however, more expensive in terms of staff time and often in terms 
of staff resistance to data recording.
Gathering such information through participant surveys also has 
certain advantages: less lead time is required; it is the only option 
available when samples are identified at termination; and state or multi- 
SDA analyses may not reflect information necessary to coordinate data 
collection by large numbers of local direct service personnel, making 
measurement at follow-up the only viable option.
Intake Services, Screening, and Selection
Since intake intensity should be compensatory, with greatest intensity 
reserved for those with greatest need, good intake will tend to equalize 
the chances for success of those with greater and lesser need. Accurately 
estimating the impact of intake on program outcomes, therefore, requires 
both measures of intake experiences and also measures of participants' 
need for intake assistance. The best approach to measuring need is to 
identify specific barriers to employment via the competency-bench 
marking approach developed most thoroughly in the area of youth 
competencies (Simpson 1989).
Measures of individual intake experiences can include both the nature 
and intensity of intake diagnosis and services. One approach would 
measure time in intake (individually or in workshops), specific intake 
diagnostics such as testing, and intensity of specific types of intake
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services such as career counseling. Another approach would identify 
separate paths taken by individuals enroute to pro gram enrollment, such 
as employer-initiated OJT contracts.
Delay Between Eligibility and Enrollment
The time lag between eligibility and enrollment may be a component 
of selection bias. Enrollment that is almost immediate typically indicates 
a referral initiated by an employer or a school, and therefore involves 
preselection. Beyond that, up to some point, delays tend to weed out the 
least motivated. Very long delays, however, probably discourage those 
most qualified and motivated.
Assignment to Basic Program Activities
Clearly, one measure of individual treatment must be the basic pro 
gram activity or activities to which each individual is assigned or 
referred. These are normally available through MIS files, although 
comparability of data elements may be an issue where multiple service 
providers are included in the analysis. Information on multiple activities 
and sequencing will often require an additional data collection effort 
beyond the standard MIS. It is especially important to distinguish 
between (1) multiple-sequenced activities planned in advance, such as 
an orientation workshop followed by classroom training, followed by 
OJT in the same skill area; and (2) "second chance" activities assigned 
to individuals who failed to utilize their first service successfully and are 
more likely to fail the second time also.
Treatment Intensity and Completion
In addition to the type of program activity, the length and intensity of 
the activity should be measured, along with whether participants complete 
their programs. The most common measure here, length of time enrolled 
in JTPA, is easy to obtain from MIS files, but confounds several 
incompatible measures: length of planned treatment, completion of 
treatment vs. dropout, addition of "second chance" treatment, treatment 
vs. dropout, addition of "second chance" treatment, and extension of 
enrollment in a postprogram administrative hold while employment is
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sought. For some of these factors, shorter enrollment indicates probable 
employment failure; for others, longer enrollment indicates probable 
failure. They must, therefore, be measured separately to produce unam 
biguous results.
Unfortunately, no precise measures of training intensity per-time- 
period exist. However, partial indicators of intensity can be measured 
once the intended nature of the intervention is identified. These might 
include whether the intervention results in a credential, in fields where 
one exists; how many hours of formal training and of "hands-on" training 
are provided; whether formal training is "mainstream" (satisfying state 
certification, taken by nondisadvantaged individuals also); and if the 
intervention involves employment, how complex the job is and how 
much new material it presents for participants to learn.
Perhaps the most important form of treatment intensity to measure is 
the presence or absence of multiple program activities assigned in 
sequence to address multiple barriers to employment. If process analysis 
indicates that serving the hard-to-serve is a priority for the organization, 
then this approach is especially important to analyze.
Characteristics of Trainers
Although factors such as trainers' methods or organizational arrange 
ments can seldom be changed by JTPA, knowledge of which types of 
trainers most effectively produce desired outcomes can improve quality 
control and referral decisions. In addition, information on effective 
training approaches may be of interest to schools and especially to 
employers, since relatively little is known about how to train effectively 
on the job.
Some measures describing trainers can be gained from participant 
follow-up surveys (Simpson 1982). However, the most reliable measure 
ment sources are trainers themselves, i.e., schools or employers. In 
classroom training, the easiest measures are typologies of trainers, e.g., 
trainers who enroll primarily JTPA participants vs. mainstream trainers, 
or trainers who are public, proprietary, or community-based. In addition, 
trainers vary in size, mix between experiential ("hands-on") and formal 
learning, inclusion of internships, and a great range of other characteris-
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tics. It is advisable to construct such measures in collaboration with local 
vocational educators, who are most aware of variations in available 
training variants.
In the cases of employer-based treatment, i.e., on-the-job training and, 
to a smaller extent, work experience and youth tryout, a wide range of 
measures is available. Relatively little research has been done, however, 
on such measures. Simpson's (1984a) Washington State OJT research 
identified characteristics of the trainer and OJT positions, including 
employer's growth rate, typical non-JTPA turnover rate, the industrial 
sector, including whether public or private, the quality and complexity 
of the job, the use of relatively formal training methods, and range of 
tranferability of skills gained from training, i.e., do they apply to a wide 
range of jobs or are they "firm-specific"?
Expenditures per Individual Participant
The primary marginal cost for each JTPA participant, is the direct cost 
of training. Although other costs are typically impossible to consider 
during a gross impact analysis, marginal training costs for each partici 
pant are usually available through contracts with trainers or employers. 
(See Zornitsky et al. 1985.) This means that the major program costs 
attached to each specific participant could be analyzed if these records 
can be integrated with the basic data set being used. However, such 
analysis is not to be confused with benefit-cost analysis. (See Johnson 
and Stromsdorfer, chapter 2 in this volume.)
Another cost issue that also represents an agency policy issue is 
ancillary support services. Except for the issue of stipends offered during 
classroom training, there appears to be no cogent reason to detail specific 
support services. However, the total amount expended per person could 
be recorded at little cost. Such services might affect program completion, 
although no postprogram impact would be expected beyond that caused 
by completion.
Needs-based payments are complex to analyze. Income from any 
source has the potential to affect life stability, personal stress, and other 
factors, which can in turn influence postprogram labor market experi 
ences. Therefore, a precise analysis of the impact of needs-based sti-
Evaluating Gross Program Outcomes 183
pends per se requires measurement of total income during training as 
well as income from stipends.
Program Exit and Job Search
Agency implementation variables, discussed earlier, measure the 
availability of various supports at termination. Individual-level meas 
ures indicate who makes use of which support services and provide the 
basis for aggregate agency-level variables. Possible measures include a 
number of job search services: enrollment in job club or less extensive 
job search courses, receipt of specific job referrals from trainers or JTPA 
staff, and receipt of less formal job search assistance from JTPA staff. It 
is also useful to measure when the services occurred. If a job search 
workshop occurred during or prior to training, all participants have had 
benefit of it by the time they have to look for work. If the workshop occurs 
after the end of training, the most successful participants will not enroll 
because they will have found jobs already. This creates a "compensatory 
effect," which is extremely difficult to analyze yalidly.
In addition, participants' job search behaviors may be important to 
measure. These include the importance participants place on finding or 
retaining work, using the skills learned during the JTPA treatment, and 
the extent to which a participant is "place bound" (unable to relocate). 
The expressed importance of working in the training area can be used as 
a control variable, but can also be analyzed as an intermediate program 
outcome. Those intending to use such analysis may wish to measure the 
same variable at enrollment in order to allow an estimate of change 
during training.
Measurement of Control Variables
As discussed earlier, the approach differential impact analysis takes to 
prevent bias involves measuring "control variables" for inclusion in 
multivariate statistical analysis. Many of the most important protections 
against bias, such as measuring selection criteria, intake procedures, and 
exit practices, are also of interest as implementation and treatment 
variants. Analysis of such measures serves the dual purposes of testing 
their impact on program outcomes and also testing whether their exclu-
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sion from multivariate equations would bias estimated impact of other 
program variants. Individual measures, such as preprogram barriers to 
employment and the route into the JTPA training activity, are also of 
interest for programmatic reasons, but in differential impact analysis 
they operate primarily as control variables.
Other control variables fall into two categories: individual back 
ground characteristics and the labor market environment. These meas 
ures are not analyzed in the hope of improving programs by changing 
them; most of them cannot be changed by program managers, or will not 
be changed, since they are part of the program mandate. They are 
important because they are likely to affect program outcomes and to 
differ across service providers, program activities, or other program 
variants. Therefore, unless they are measured and included in differen 
tial impact equations, the estimated impact of program variants of 
interest to program managers can be biased.
Several individual background characteristics affect program out 
comes: inherited characteristics, such as gender and ethnicity; previ 
ously achieved characteristics, such as education level and work expe 
rience; and life cycle situation, such as marital status and number of 
dependents. Some mix of these measures is normally available in 
management information systems. Where factors known to affect labor 
market experiences are omitted from MIS files, or where measurement 
is truncated to distinguish only program eligibles from noneligibles, 
MIS files must be augmented. Borus (1979) provides a detailed enu 
meration of individual background measures found to influence em 
ployment status. Readers are referred there for information on the 
development of control variables measuring individual background.
One difficulty with preprogram measures is establishing their proper 
time frame. "Preprogram dip" in earnings and employment has been 
grappled with in much detail, making clear that information running 
back as far as three years before the program can be useful (Bloom and 
McLaughlin 1982; Johnson and Stromsdorfer, chapter 2 in this volume). 
That period may be too costly for agency data collection, but it is clear 
that too short a preprogram period, such as three or six months, will 
underestimate the long-term earning potential of many participants and 
will fail to distinguish those with temporary problems from others.
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Measures of labor market characteristics are quite powerful in national 
studies. They appear to have less effect on training outcomes in a single 
state or locale. Even so, any study comparing service delivery in more 
than one geographic area must test the possibility that differences in 
unemployment levels, average salary levels, or demand for particular 
types of jobs may affect estimates of differential impact analysis. Aside 
from census and employment data, the availability of labor market 
measures depends primarily on the role each state has played in devel 
oping reliable occupational outlook data. Most SDAs have compiled this 
information during their planning periods.
Construction of Category Identifiers
The simplest but most important form of data any differential impact 
analysis requires is a set of code numbers that identifies individuals and 
their membership in various categories. These categories include sets of 
service providers, specific trainers, and types of services. Each category 
to be identified during analysis must have a unique identification 
number. These are required 
1. To merge data from different sources, allowing the construction of 
data sets that include the full range of test and control variables, and 
allowing inexpensive service provider data to be integrated into in 
dividual-level analysis.
2. To organize the data set and know what original records to consult 
in cases where errors on the computer file must be corrected.
3. To construct membership identifiers. These variables are the vehicle 
required before differential impact analysis can test the impact of 
membership in particular organizational units, activities, or fields. 
(The construction of such variables is discussed below.) 
The identifiers listed below should be included in any analysis which 
utilizes data from each source mentioned. The precise nature of each 
identifier depends on the common practice in the state or SDAs mounting 
the analysis effort.
Participant identifiers. Codes identifying individual participants are 
the basic data-file organizing unit and are also necessary in order to 
merge data from MIS files, follow-up interviews, and individual treat-
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ment records. The best participant identifier is a social security number, 
which is unique and normally required if official data such as UI, welfare, 
or criminal justice information is to be combined with JTPA data.
Employer identifiers. If employer interviews are conducted, data must 
be collected under an identifying code, unique for each employer, which 
is also recorded on each participant's file. In this way, the appropriate 
employer data may be added to the files of each individual. If agencies 
have not yet developed employer identification codes, they will also find 
them extremely useful for organizing employer relations and marketing 
information and assessing use patterns and retention track records of 
participating employers.
Classroom trainer identifiers. If special data are collected on class 
room trainers, they must be catalogued under identifiers also included on 
participant records to allow data merging. In addition, trainers enrolling 
a sufficient number of participants in a sample may be tested using either/ 
or membership variables, if each trainer has a unique identifier.
Training field identifiers. The field in which participants trained or 
gained work experience should be identified. This allows description of 
outcomes by field, construction of either/or membership variables where 
the number of cases allows, and introduction of labor market data tied to 
training field.
SDA and subcontractor identifiers. When an analysis combines SDAs, 
each must be uniquely identified in order to test for differences in 
outcomes produced by each and add labor market data to individual 
computer files. The same is true for subcontractor comparisons within 
one or more SDAs. If subcontractors are numbered within each SDA, 
unique identifiers can be formed by combining SDA and subcontractor 
identifiers.
Time period identifiers. The simplest reliable way to calculate time 
periods, such as lag between eligibility and enrollment, is to record the 
date of each event, including eligibility, enrollment, treatment start, 
planned treatment end, actual treatment end, termination, and follow-up. 
If dates are expressed in compatible units, time periods can then be 
calculated by subtracting one from the other.
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Measures That Place Special Demands on Sampling
The measures of program variants just reviewed may be placed into 
four categories, in order to focus on two types that make special demands 
on the size or structure of samples. These four approaches are shown in 
exhibit 3.10. The term "variable description" refers to measures that may 
take a range of values, for example, percentages, amounts, or degrees of 
some quality. These are the most common types of measures, explaining 
why measures are often referred to as variables. They are distinguished 
from "membership identifiers," which always take only two values. The 
individual (1) does or (2) does not belong to that category.
Standard sampling considerations are structured for variables meas 
ured at the individual level. The two-program implementation measures 
in exhibit 3.10 place special demands on the sample. The demands differ 
depending on whether the measure is a membership identifier, indicating 
whether or not a participant was served via some specific treatment 
context, or a variable description of some particular aspect of program 
implementation. Membership identifiers, which indicate whether or not 
individuals received services via a particular organizational or treatment 
activity provide an effective way to locate impacts on postprogram 
outcomes, but not to explain why they are located where they are. 
Variable descriptions of program characteristics, on the other hand, 
measure specific qualities that vary across all service providers or 
program activities, rather than separating each as a whole from the 
others. This approach does not pinpoint concrete contexts where differ-
Exhibit3.10
Four Approaches to Measuring Program Variants, 
With Examples
Program Implementation
(Measured via a Survey Measure of
of Service Providers) Individual Treatment
Identifier of Enrolled through N W Trained in community
membership in a corner SDA, subcontractor college program
specific context No. 3 versus all others versus all others
Variable description Percent of services Planned length of
of program performed m-house participant's
characteristics training program
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ences occur. However, it helps explain why they occur, a quality which 
makes them especially helpful for program development. The particular 
demands placed on sampling differ between the analysis of membership 
identifiers and the analysis of variable program descriptions.
Membership Identifiers
Measures that identify membership in particular treatment contexts 
place little restriction on the number of service providers or other 
treatment contexts required. If two contexts are identifiable, they may be 
compared by entering the membership identifier into an equation that 
also includes the appropriate control variables. However, this simplicity 
is gained at some cost. First, explanatory power is no greater with 20 
contexts than with two. Each context is compared individually with all 
others. Second, reliability of such comparisons depends on the number 
of participants enrolled in each membership group. Thus, no matter how 
large the total sample, estimates for membership in a category containing 
very few participants cannot be reliable. This means that analysis of this 
type may require large, disproportionately stratified samples.
Membership in highly specific contexts, such as particular schools or 
employers, is usually immune to analysis because so few individuals 
belong to each context. Membership in larger units, such as SDAs, is 
entirely possible to assess given that a large enough sample is drawn from 
each SDA. This limitation on the analysis of specific treatment contexts 
is of greatest interest for states and large SDAs, which may wish to assess 
relative performance among different units within the system.
Variable Descriptions of Program Implementation 
The sampling demands made by variable descriptions of implementa 
tion are directly opposite to those made by membership identifiers; they 
require multiple treatment contexts, but not larger samples within each. 
Since participants in each context receive a specific value on some 
measurement scale, the number of participants in each context matters 
little. Thus, sample stratification is unnecessary. That advantage, how 
ever, is purchased at the cost of requiring multiple treatment contexts to 
be included in the sample.
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Imagine that two service providers have been measured on two 
variables intensity of intake procedures and the degree of job search 
assistance provided. If we find that the two providers differ in outcome 
level, how can we decide which of these variables accounts for the 
difference? For that matter, how can we claim that either of these, rather 
than some other variable, explains the difference? To assess whether 
intake or placement had the impact, we need to compare situations 
characterized by thorough intake but little job search assistance, and vice 
versa. With only two organizations, however, that is not possible. These 
two agency characteristics, as well as any others one can imagine, are by 
definition perfectly correlated and cannot be disentangled. (In statistical 
terms, only one degree of freedom is available.)
This same problem faces research comparing more than two contexts, 
where the variable in question happens to differentiate only one from all 
others. An analysis reported by Franklin and Ripley (1984) illustrates. 
They report that program performance was lower in CETA prime 
sponsors characterized by "crisis management" style. While this finding 
appears reasonable, only one prime sponsor in their sample was so 
characterized. Their conclusion, therefore, was based on a comparison 
between one prime sponsor and 14 others. Consequently, any number of 
other qualities of that one prime sponsor could have produced the 
differences they observed.
In the case where three service providers are included in a sample, it 
is very likely that the problems discussed above will remain. However, 
there is now a possibility that, in unusual circumstances, one variable 
characteristic of service providers would have such a strong and consis 
tent impact that a statistically reliable effect would emerge. The principle 
of parsimony using the simplest explanation consistent with the facts  
becomes the guide to interpretation here. If the differences among 
outcomes in the three contexts closely fit a single linear treatment 
measure, but no others, then it is parsimonious to explain findings with 
that one factor. If, however, they vary far from a linear fit, or if more than 
one variable fits equally well, the less tidy, but more accurate interpre 
tation must be used; namely, that each unit differs from the other for 
reasons we cannot demonstrate.
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If we introduced a second treatment characteristic variable into the 
analysis based on three contexts, we would automatically revert to the 
case in which it is impossible to distinguish among competing explana 
tions. In statistical terms, the number of variables that may be uniquely 
estimated may not be greater than the degrees of freedom, which equal 
the number of cases minus one. Since these variables are measured only 
at the organizational level, the number of cases we are speaking about is 
the number of service-providing organizations in the analysis.
Extending this line of thought, it is apparent that analysis including 
many SDAs or analysis of large SDAs including many service providers 
can be especially valuable for local program development. The larger the 
number of different agencies in the analysis, the more feasible the tests 
of agency implementation variables. More variables can be handled 
simultaneously, and each is tested more reliably and less ambiguously. 
That is, other things equal, the more separate service providers included 
in a sample, the lower the covariance among implementation variants is 
likely to be, strengthening the ability of multivariate analysis to estimate 
the unique effects of each.
This general rule, that the larger the number of contexts, the firmer the 
analysis of variable program characteristics, leads to a practical question: 
what is the minimum number of service providers required for a reason 
able differential impact analysis of agency-level implementation meas 
ures? The answer is twofold. First, the bad news. The answer depends 
on many factors: variance in each independent variable, variance in the 
outcome variable, covariance among independent variables, and covari 
ance between independent variables and the outcome variable. There 
fore, no precise minimum can be set forth. One might reasonably say that 
there is little point in pursuing analysis of variable program implemen 
tation measures with fewer than six or seven service providers. In many 
cases this would be too few, while in others, it would be sufficient.
Second, the good news. There is an analysis procedure that can in most 
cases protect against incorrectly attributing too much importance to 
variable descriptions of program characteristics. This procedure in 
volves jointly testing the variable program characteristic measures along 
with membership identifiers indicating enrollment in each particular
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service provider in the sample. After identifying variable program 
characteristics that appear statistically reliable, the analyst then adds to 
the equation the set of membership identifiers indicating enrollment 
through each specific service provider. 10
If the variable program characteristics retain their statistically reliable 
effects, then our confidence in the initial findings remains high. If their 
effect in the equation is eliminated by the addition of the membership 
identifiers, then we must conclude either that some service providers 
differ from each other, but we do not know why, or that the initial test 
procedure was inappropriate. With small numbers of units, the latter is 
always a strong likelihood.
Analysis Procedures for Descriptive 
Outcome and Differential Impact Evaluations
This chapter makes no attempt to provide instruction in the use of 
statistics. However, a brief overview of analysis strategies for descriptive 
gross outcomes analysis and differential impact analysis may be useful.
Descriptive analysis involves quite basic statistical tools. The value of 
descriptive analysis rests more on the thought that goes into the questions 
the analyst asks than on statistical sophistication. Descriptive analysis 
begins with univariate (one-variable) averages or percentage distribu 
tions. Beyond that, bivariate (two-variable) associations can be calcu 
lated, as long as the analyst bears in mind that descriptive associations 
can be produced by many factors other than the two being analyzed. 
Exhibit 3.11 describes conditions under which different bivariate statis 
tics are most appropriate.
Differential impact analysis can be performed satisfactorily with 
standard multiple regression techniques, except for one particular situ 
ation, which is discussed. The strategy of multivariate analysis is 
straightforward. One outcome is analyzed, with multiple potential influ 
ences tested simultaneously to estimate the unique impact of each on the 
outcome. In this instance, the goal is to ascertain whether and how much 
policy variables of interest affect the outcome after taking into account 
the possible effects of other factors such as selection. However, the 
statistical techniques required to implement that strategy require special-
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ized training. Parts of the discussion that follows assume prior back 
ground in multivariate analysis.
Analyzing Various Types of Measures
A wide range of statistics is available in various software packages. 
However, nearly all statistical tests required for descriptive gross impact 
analysis or differential impact analysis can be performed with four basic 
tools: chi square, analysis of variance (ANOVA), Pearson correlation, 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Why these are typically 
adequate is laid out in a highly readable form in Bjornstadt and Knoke 
(1982). Which of these is used depends on the nature of the analysis and 
the way in which the variable was measured commonly referred to as 
the level of measurement. Exhibit 3.11 suggests appropriate statistics for 
different levels of measurement and for different analysis goals.
The critical distinction regarding level of measurement is between 
ordered and nominal variables. Ordered variables are those for which 
values assigned to each category of the variable form a logically 
defensible sequence from smaller to larger, lower to higher, etc. Ordered 
variables include age, level of satisfaction, costs, ratings on various 
descriptive scales, and the like.
Variables that cannot be ordered are termed nominal variables. The 
categories of variables like marital status or SDA identification codes 
cannot be placed in a meaningful hierarchy or sequence. The results of 
tests that require ordered variables would be meaningless if applied to 
nominal variables such as these.
Dichotomous variables, those taking only two values, such as "yes" 
and "no," occupy a special status in that they are by definition ordered, 
even when they appear logically nonorderable. Any variable that in 
cludes only two values can be expressed as a yes/no question. In the case 
of one SDA vs. others, for example, the variable becomes "Did this 
participant enroll through SDA #1?" The responses "yes" and "no" are 
interpretable as ordered, with yes greater than no. It is this quality of 
dichotomies that makes membership identifiers especially powerful in 
differential impact analysis.
Statistical assumptions vary somewhat for dependent (outcome) vari-
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Exhibit 3.11 

















































1 If ordered variables contain few (3 - 6) categories, it may also be advisable to observe relation 
ships in tabular form However, the chi square statistic would typically underestimate the hkeh 
hood of a reliable relationship because it ignores information on order
2 In this case it is convenient to treat the independent variable as the dependent, and vice versa, so 
that ANOVA may be used.
3 In the dichotomous case, the t-test is equivalent to the F test used in ANOVA.
4 If available to the analyst, recent developments by Goodman (1972) make limited multivanate 
analysis of nominal variables possible (See also Davis 1974.) Goodman's program is named 
ECTA (Everyman's Contingency Table Analysis). SPSSx has also installed a version.
ables vs. independent (predictor, explanatory) variables. Therefore, the 
choice of statistical tools depends on the level of measurement for each. 
Exhibit 3.11 reflects this requirement. Analysis goals are separated into 
bivariate (two-variable) and multivariate (one dependent variable, more 
than one independent variable) cases, with measurement indicated for 
both independent and dependent variables.
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Multivariate Analysis with a Dichotomous Dependent Variable
Every statistic is developed on the basis of mathematical assumptions. 
In the case of ordinary least squares regression, many of the original 
restrictive assumptions have proven unnecessary. That is, the statistic is 
highly robust; data can be structured in ways not fully satisfying 
statistical assumptions, yet the statistic produces accurate and efficient 
estimates. Even so, in the case where the dependent variable is dichoto- 
mous and is highly skewed (unevenly distributed), assumptions are vio 
lated severely and error can result.
Happily, recent work with statistics based on log-linear transforma 
tions of dichotomous dependent variables and using "maximum like 
lihood chi square goodness of fit" tests avoid the problems faced by 
ordinary regression. This means that appropriate conservative multivari- 
ate methods to analyze dichotomies, such as whether or not participants 
are employed at follow-up, do exist. Regression tests have been com 
pared with these more conservative methods, with the result that we can 
now be quite certain when we are required to use the more conservative, 
but also less convenient, methods and when the simpler regression 
analysis is appropriate. (See Knoke 1975; Goodman 1976; Gillespi 
1977.) The following guidelines summarize this knowledge:
1. If a dichotomous dependent variable is split relatively evenly (be 
tween 75 percent/25 percent and 25 percent/75 percent) OLS regres 
sion may be used.
2. If OLS regression cannot be used and all or many independent 
variables are ordered, Logit or Probit transformations of the depend 
ent variable are advisable.
3. If OLS regression cannot be used and many independent variables 
are dichotomous or nominal, Goodman's Multiway Contingency 
Table Analysis may be used.
Constructing and Testing
Membership Identifiers ("Dummy Variables")
Some extremely valuable factors to include as independent variables 
in multiple regression analysis are measured as nominal variables, which 
are not admissible in a regression equation. Nominal variables may be
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analyzed, however, after they are transformed into dichotomies that are 
tested in place of the original variable. These dichotomies, known as 
"dummy variables" in formal statistical analysis, are called membership 
identifiers throughout this chapter to indicate their nature, i.e., they 
measure whether or not a participant belongs to a particular category. For 
example, MIS systems may include a measure of ethnicity, including 
values for each of five or more major groups. If membership variables are 
constructed for each of these groups (e.g., a variable named "othwhite," 
and scored 1 for all originally coded "other white" and 0 for all others), 
these new dichotomies may be tested as independent variables in 
regression analysis.
Regression slopes that result from tests of dummy variables, if 
statistically reliable, indicate that members of the named group (e.g., 
those enrolled through unit A, "other white" participants, or OJT partici 
pants) are the estimated average amount higher or lower on the outcome 
in question than all members of other groups. All but one of the dummy 
variables created from an original nominal variable may be tested in a 
single equation.
Constructing and Testing Interaction Terms
One useful type of question for JTPA program managers may be 
addressed by using interaction terms. This question is Do particular 
groups of participants, more than others, experience greater success from 
some program variants than from other variants? For example, is 
classroom training (CT) more successful than other treatments in erasing 
the deficit produced by previous low educational attainment? In an 
interaction, two variables combine to produce a joint effect different 
from that which both acting independently would produce. In the 
example, dropping out of high school reduces postprogram outcomes 
and CT may, in itself, produce higher or lower than average outcomes. 
In addition, the interaction hypothesis suggests that the impact of 
educational attainment on postprogram outcomes is stronger when the 
treatment is not classroom training than when it is. To test such an 
hypothesis, one must construct an interaction term that would be scored 
1 for dropouts who enroll in CT and 0 for all others. This interaction term,
196 Evaluating Social Problems
the product of the other two, identifies those individuals who were in a 
position to have some portion of their educational deficit eliminated by 
participation in CT.
Normally, the interaction term, appropriate control variables, and the 
original variables from which the interaction was constructed must all be 
included in one multiple regression equation (Blalock 1965). Since the 
interaction term will include portions of both original variables, an effect 
of either or both original variables would erroneously be carried by the 
interaction term alone. Only when the original terms are both included 
in the test can we be certain an effect of the interaction term is not 
spurious. 11 If such a test produced, for example, a slope of -0.20 for 
dropout status and +0.10 for the interaction term, then the proper 
interpretation would be (a) that being a high school dropout, in itself, 
reduces postprogram employment 20 percent, and (b) that CT erases half 
of the education effect among dropouts, so that dropouts who enrolled in 
CT experience only a 10 percent lower placement rate (-0.20 +0.10).
Reporting Standardized or Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
Standardized regression coefficients, termed "Betas," are often re 
ported because they indicate the relative power of each variable in one 
equation to account for variation in the dependent variable. Betas have 
a commonsense meaning similar to that of a correlation: a Beta of 0.5 
always indicates a "stronger" effect than a Beta of 0.4. Unstandardized 
coefficients (regression slopes) are expressed in terms of the metric of the 
independent and dependent variables, and are much more precise but 
often less intuitively satisfying. If, for example, education is scored using 
a four-point scale, a slope of 0.10 indicates that each step of that 
education scale raises the outcome variable by 0.10. The lowest step 
compared with the highest, three intervals above, has an estimated 0.30 
higher level. If the dependent variable is employment status, 0.30 
translates to 30 percent. If it is hourly wage, 0.30 translates to 30 cents.
These considerations make slopes somewhat more complex than 
Betas to communicate when findings are reported. When results of 
research are being applied to program development efforts, however, 
Unstandardized slopes are the preferable estimate because they give a
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direct estimate of the amount of change in an outcome that is produced 
by a given change in the input. Is it more helpful for me to know that 
education, which I cannot control, is more powerful than program 
activity? Or am I better served by estimating that after the effects of 
education are accounted for, my OJT program produces postprogram 
wages an estimated 47 cents lower (or higher) than my CT program? 
Clearly the latter, unstandardized report is preferable.
In addition, unlike standardized Betas, unstandardized slopes are not 
influenced by the variance of a particular variable within a sample. This 
can be important when relatively small subgroups are being analyzed. If 
only 10 percent of my sample enrolled in work experience, even if WEX 
participants are employed only half as often as others, the variable 
"enrolled in WEX?" can explain only a limited portion of the variation 
in employment experienced by the entire sample. However, the unstan 
dardized slope indicates how much less often this minority is employed 
than are other participants. The slope remains the same whether 10 
percent or 50 percent of participants are enrolled in work experience.
In general, unstandardized regression slopes are both more useful and 
easier to report when (1) the dependent variable is naturally interpretable, 
as in the case of income or a dichotomy that translates to percentages, and 
(2) the independent variable is a dichotomy, allowing statements like 
"participants in category A are X percent higher than those in category B" 
In other cases, the analyst must choose between reporting ease and 
managerial usefulness. For a full analysis, both forms augment each 
other. For example, a report might indicate that a particular program 
service has a negligible impact on variation in outcomes for an entire 
SDA, but go on to show a large impact on a few clients.
Estimating Change
For descriptive analysis, change may be indicated by subtracting the 
preprogram value from the postprogram value of an identically measured 
variable. This procedure is simple and the results are often taken at face 
value. However, the descriptive report of change is especially problem 
atic because change is heavily dependent on the original base figure. If, 
for example, a sample includes many students or displaced homemakers
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with zero earnings during the preprogram year, then regardless of 
program impact, that group is likely to generate higher change in 
earnings than a group including primarily high previous earners. At the 
other end of the scale, displaced-worker programs will typically show 
negative change figures a reduction in earnings not because they are 
less effective than other programs, but because preprogram earnings 
were especially high. This problem is especially severe if preprogram 
values vary more widely than postprogram values, as is more often the 
case in highly successful programs than in less successful programs. 12 
For this reason, presentation of descriptive change results can be seri 
ously misleading.
In multivariate differential impact analysis, the goal is to estimate 
unique causal effects of each factor tested. Since the preprogram level of 
an outcome variable clearly affects change in that variable, any analysis 
of change must include that level as a predictor in the regression 
equation. This necessity leads to an approach that considerably improves 
the ease and usefulness of change analysis. Predicting change with 
preprogram level produces awkward results, i.e., higher preprogram 
levels of any variable produce lower rates of change. However, it is 
possible (and preferable) to replace change with postprogram level as the 
outcome being predicted. Since change is calculated as postprogram 
minus preprogram level, any two of the following variables is sufficient 
to produce the third via simple mathematical operations: (1) the 
preprogram level, (2) the postprogram level, and (3) change. Therefore, 
the equation is satisfied regardless of which two are used.
It is preferable to use the two that produce the most sensible results: the 
postprogram outcome as dependent variable and the preprogram meas 
ure of the same outcome as a control variable. In such a case, the effect 
of preprogram on postprogram level (the autoregression term) indicates 
stability over time, i.e., the tendency for those most employable before 
the program to be most employable after the program also. Other 
variables in the equation that show a reliable impact on the postprogram 
outcome may be correctly interpreted as indicating factors that increase 
or decrease (change) the outcome in question from the preprogram to the 
postprogram period.
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These considerations open another possibility. It is a short step to 
conclude that the multivariate analysis of change is hurt very little if the 
preprogram measure differs slightly from the parallel postprogram 
measure. The analysis still indicates which factors increase or decrease 
the outcome controlling for preprogram level of approximately the same 
factor. Identical pre- and postprogram measures are desirable. However, 
the analysis of change remains possible with less-than-exactly parallel 
pre- and postprogram measures.
Analyzing a Large Number of Potential Influences on Outcomes
Multivariate analysis is straightforward in studies where only a few 
theoretically derived variables are tested. All are entered into the equa 
tion and the results reported. In cases where many measures are to be 
tested as independent variables, however, it is no longer possible or 
advisable to include all in a single test. Such attempts can make undue 
demands on the sample size, a problem that becomes especially serious 
if the sample size is reduced by the accumulation of missing cases from 
each of the many variables involved. This produces the problem of how 
to move through multiple tests efficiently without distorting or overlook 
ing effects. The following suggestions may assist in that endeavor. 
Performing such analysis, of course, requires prior statistical back 
ground. This "cookbook" summary is not meant to imply otherwise. It 
only suggests steps to make analysis relatively efficient.
Step 1. Insure that variables are in the proper form for multivariate 
analysis and that variation is sufficient to make analysis meaningful. For 
data management purposes it is advisable to construct a "codebook" 
listing all variables and showing for each the level of measurement, 
number of useable cases, and an indicator of variation.
Step 2. Select the appropriate dependent variable for each analysis.
Step 3. Separate variables according to their importance to the analy 
sis. Those that are most important, because they are known to affect the 
outcome and must be included to prevent bias or because they hold 
special program development interest, should be given priority during 
analysis.
Step 4. Separate variables according to missing cases. In particular,
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questions asked only of subsets of participants, such as job qualities or 
reasons for unemployment, should be analyzed separately from other 
questions applying to all. The safest form of multivariate analysis is 
based only on cases for which full information on all variables is present. 
Under that approach, any case with a single missing value is eliminated 
from the entire analysis.
Step 5. Compute correlations between all independent variables and 
the dependent variable being analyzed. Correlations are the basis for the 
calculation of multiple regression coefficients, making them the appro 
priate bivariate test building toward regression analysis.
Step 6. Identify those variables that are appropriate in terms of missing 
values and have high priority as control variables those required to 
protect against biased estimates. Observe their correlations with the 
outcome(s) in question. Select from this set those variables exhibiting a 
reliable association with the outcome being analyzed.
Step 7. Enter the variables selected at the conclusion of step 6 into a 
multiple regression equation, to identify the subset of these variables that 
have reliable multivariate effects on the outcome. For simplicity, ana 
lysts may use a stepwise procedure, which automatically selects reliable 
effects. This produces a minimal set of control variables which must be 
included in subsequent runs. Other variables from these tests may be set 
aside for the moment with the knowledge that were they included in the 
regression equation, their effect would be too small to alter findings 
noticeably.
Step 8. Identify the most important test variables, i.e., program 
variants of special policy interest. Observe their correlations with the 
outcome in question, selecting those showing reliable association. Enter 
these singly, or in appropriate sets, into equations that include the 
minimal set of control variables identified in step 7.
Step 9. In addition to variables tested in step 8, analysts may wish to 
explore other program variants, hoping to discover useful unexpected 
relationships. Group measures according to policy area, such as intake, 
quality control, or trainer characteristics. Correlate these with the out 
come being analyzed and enter those which are reliably greater than zero 
into an equation including the minimal set of control variables identified 
in step 7.
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Step 10. The procedures outlined above for reducing the set of reliable 
effects ignores the possibility of suppression, a situation in which two 
variables are correlated with each other but have opposite effects on the 
dependent variables and, therefore, tend to cancel each other out in 
bivariate tests. These effects become visible only when both independent 
variables are tested jointly. They are, therefore, overlooked when only 
reliable bivariate correlations are forwarded for test in regression equa 
tions, as in steps 6-9.
Short of a full exposition of this issue, one step may be suggested to 
guard against most errors of this type. Suppression of the type the analyst 
most wishes to uncover occurs only when some variable is correlated 
with one of the variables identified during steps 8 and 9 as reliable 
predictors. Correlations should, therefore, be calculated between each of 
these reliable effects and other independent variables. Where reliable 
correlations are found, the variable in question may be added to the 
reduced set of reliable effects located after step 8 or 9. Relatively few 
changes will be produced by such a procedure, but it does guard against 
the most damaging errors from undetected relationships. These tests may 
be facilitated by using a backwards stepwise elimination of unreliable 
effects, where statistical packages include this option.
Step 11. Membership identifier variables, such as service provider, 
industrial sector, and similar others, should be examined if they have not 
already been included as program variants. These may be added to the 
reduced sets of reliable effects identified in steps 8, 9, or 10. Findings 
may prove useful for future contracting or marketing. Also, such tests 
protect against spurious findings of program effects.
Step 12. Finally, having identified reduced sets of the most powerful 
and unique effects on each outcome being analyzed, the analyst will be 
well-advised to return to the data set in order to examine what measures 
are associated with these key effects. Such analyses may be conducted 
formally, using these key effects as dependent variables in their own 
right, or may be undertaken as less formalized examinations of patterned 
associations. Such further analysis can corroborate or challenge initial 
interpretations, or can help the analyst develop interpretations of initial 
findings by detailing the apparent nature of the variables found to have 
greatest impact on the outcome.
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Combining Data from Different Sources
One complexity of effective differential impact analysis is the need to 
combine data from several different sources into a tailor-made data set. 
The combination of data also provides two of the method's strengths: 
the ability to protect against selection bias from several angles, and the 
ability to measure different types of variables in the most reliable and 
efficient manner.
Aside from the availability of appropriate computer facilities, the key 
to combining (merging) data is to include the correct identifiers in each 
data set to be merged. It is advisable to produce a master identifier cover 
sheet to become part of each participant data file. This sheet should 
include all the identifying information required to merge data: partici 
pant social security number, SDA identifier, agency (subcontractor) 
identifier, employer identifier, etc.
For differential impact analysis, all data should be merged into 
individual participant records, since the participant is the unit of analy 
sis. All identifiers must appear in the participant's original data file. Each 
of the other original files must contain only the particular identifier 
required to correctly merge into the participant file. For example, 
implementation program variants are measured at the agency level. Each 
participant who enrolled through the agency with the ID code "10" will 
receive values on all implementation variables which were provided by 
that agency. The agency identifier will appear on those participants' 
master identifier sheets and also on the appropriate agency implemen 
tation data reports, allowing the match of identifiers, followed by the 
combination of data.
Once data sets are merged, statistical tests will be calculated on the 
basis of the number of participants (or employers) in the data set, not on 
the basis of the number of service providers or geographical regions that 
may have supplied particular data elements. The analyst must, therefore, 
remain aware of limitations surrounding the number of separate treat 
ment contexts required for reliable differential impact tests (discussed 
earlier).
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Research Design for an Employer Follow-Up
With the advent of JTPA and the expansion of private sector involve 
ment, interest in measuring employer benefits has risen. The popularity 
of this issue among service providers is no doubt connected to a concern 
for marketing JTPA services and products to employers. The perceptions 
of OJT or WEX employers are useful to indicate which program 
approaches are relatively effective, which are distasteful to employers, 
and what steps might encourage or discourage future participation by 
employers (e.g., Wentling and Lawson 1975; Minnesota Office of 
Statewide CETA Coordination 1979; Simpson 1984b). Employers may 
be interviewed primarily as a marketing tool. In addition, employer 
interviews can be valuable program evaluation tools. They may be used 
to assess the effectiveness of participant services or to assess employer 
benefits, both central to JTPA program development. How these goals 
translate into a research design depends on the relation of the employers 
being studied to JTPA, in particular, whether they are participating 
employers or termination employers.
Termination employers are those who employed participants at their 
termination from any program activity. They are consumers of JTPA's 
"products." Some hire former JTPA participants without knowing that 
the training their new employees received was supported by JTPA. 
Others have participated in providing training or experience to the 
participants they subsequently hire at termination.
Participating employers are those who participated in the delivery of 
services, through on-the-job training, work experience, or tryout, regard 
less of the termination status of the participants involved. Many become 
termination employers also. However, many employers participate in 
contracts that end prematurely, or complete a contract but choose not to 
hire the JTPA participant following his or her participation in JTPA.
For termination employers, surveys may ask direct marketing ques 
tions, such as how the employer came to hire a JTPA product, or may 
address indirect marketing goals, such as measuring employer satisfac 
tion with the former participant hired, with the goal of demonstrating 
program success to future employers. For participating employers, 
marketing questions may be expanded to include willingness to continue
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or expand future participation. In this case, the goals of marketing the 
program and assessing employer costs or benefits overlap. The major 
marketing tool for engaging new employers in service delivery is evi 
dence that past participating employers feel that the benefits of partici 
pating have outweighed the costs.
For termination employers, the goals of assessing participant services 
and employer benefits are nearly identical. Employer costs or benefits 
occur entirely because participants are or are not well-prepared for their 
jobs. In the case of participating employers, reports of costs and benefits 
can include not only ratings of the participant, but also evaluations of the 
JTPA programs and personnel and direct perceptions of participation as 
beneficial or costly.
Employer surveys are unique in that many employer reports may be 
taken at face value and are, therefore, especially useful for descriptive 
analysis. The employer's role as consumer of JTPA products (partici 
pants), makes employer ratings of participants valuable to JTPA pro 
gram operators regardless of the factors influencing them. Because JTPA 
agencies wish to have the most effective participating employers repeat 
their involvement, employer satisfaction with agency policies or person 
nel is critical. Similarly, employers' perceptions that they have benefited 
from participating in delivering JTPA services are meaningful descrip 
tive estimates of employer costs and benefits.
In addition, information gathered from employers can be valuable to 
the analysis of participant outcomes. Employers are in a unique position 
to report subtle job quality outcomes, certain forms of selection, and for 
participating employers, individual-level measures of training provided 
or other qualities of the program intervention.
Identifying Employer Population to 
Be Analyzed and Designing the Sample
The most basic of all employer design questions is whether the 
population being studied includes all termination employers, all partici 
pating employers, or both. In addition, managers who wish an in-depth 
analysis of one specific program activity may prefer an even more 
specific definition, such as all OJT employers. Aside from modest differ-
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ences in cost, these decisions should be made on the basis of policy 
objectives. To which programs do managers wish to apply the results? Are 
specific services earmarked for further development? Is descriptive 
material on the range of all employers' experiences needed? The research 
design should be shaped by these decisions; it should not drive them.
Any analysis of participating employers must include all participating 
employers within the program services to be analyzed. In the event that 
one participant is placed with more than one employer before program 
termination, both employers must be included. To identify the sample of 
participating employers only from the population of those who were the 
"final" employers, is to bias the employer sample by eliminating a group 
of placements that worked out especially poorly those that ended 
prematurely and were followed by transfer to further treatment.
Sample Size
Only one issue differentiates participant and employer sampling with 
regard to sample size: the completion rate for employer surveys will 
probably reach 80 percent or more. Therefore, the initial sample of 
employers required to produce a target sample of completed interviews 
is smaller than that required with participant samples. For example, if 
we decide to aim for 400 completed interviews and expect an 80 percent 
completion rate, an initial sample of 500 will suffice. For a participant 
survey with 70 percent completion rate, the figure would be 571.
Integrating Employer and Participant Samples
Combining employer and participant data is recommended for any but 
the most basic marketing study or descriptive analysis of employer 
benefits. If both employer and participant follow-up analyses are con 
ducted, samples should overlap as much as possible. The validity of each 
in no way depends on the degree of overlap between the participant and 
employer samples; it depends on the representativeness of each sample. 
A sample of participants selected at random will produce some propor 
tion with employers those employed at termination, or those in em 
ployer-based programs, depending on whether the employer survey is of 
termination or participating employers. This sample selection also
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produces a random sample of the program's employers, and insures a 
substantial number of cases in which both participant and employer data 
are available for joint analysis.
Follow-Up Period
Employer surveys should allow a lag time after hire, long enough for 
the employer to observe the former participant's work and decide 
whether to retain the individual, but short enough to allow employers to 
retain clear impressions of participants who remained on the job only 
briefly. Lag time should also be short enough for impressions of working 
with JTPA to remain salient. Since most positions gained by JTPA 
graduates have relatively short probationary periods, a three-month 
follow-up survey should be adequate for an employer survey. This also 
gives participating employers who hire participants at termination enough 
time to observe their new workers under full-wage conditions. In cases 
where OJT positions involve a posttermination performance payment, 
follow-up should occur at least one month after the final performance 
payment to avoid distortion from expected payments.
Data Collection Methods
Most employers rely heavily on telephone communications and re 
spond well to telephone interviews, especially if they are scheduled 
beforehand. Agency personnel who work with employers may resist 
interviewing, feeling that the intrusion on employers' time jeopardizes 
good will. Experience with CETA and JTPA surveys shows, however, 
that brief interviews are usually accepted and the majority of employers 
are pleased that JTPA staff care enough about the quality of their program 
to check with those who consume their products.
In-House vs. Third-Party Data Collection
Because JTPA staff work closely with many employers, there are 
program development advantages in having staff conduct the interviews. 
These interviews are efficient because they occur along with other 
employer contacts. They also allow staff to enhance their program 
development and employer quality review by integrating them with
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employer data collection. Staff interviews may introduce response bias 
problems, however, because participating employers may wish to par 
ticipate again and may be less than candid about their costs and benefits 
from participation.
Viewed from the standpoint of measurement validity, research efforts 
must be neutral. If the results of an employer analysis are to be dissemi 
nated publicly, both the employers responding to the survey and the 
research consumers must be assured of the neutrality of the measurement 
and analysis, and of the confidentiality of individual responses. Simi 
larly, if employers themselves are being assessed, a third-party research 
team should collect data, with guarantees of confidentiality. 13 If em 
ployer surveys are conducted in-house, efforts can be made to ensure the 
perception of neutrality (see Dillman 1978; Bradburn 1983); however, 
these measures cannot successfully emulate third-party neutrality.
Estimating Employer Costs and
Benefits Using the Gross Impact Approach
Job training programs have an impact on employers as well as on 
participants. Employers may be viewed as direct beneficiaries of the job 
training system and in some cases, as incurring costs of providing 
services to that system. In fact, it is often difficult to separate benefits to 
employers from benefits to participants and society. When a placement 
works well, all benefit. When an employer provides training, the partici 
pant can become more employable (either within the firm, or generally), 
and the employer can gain a more productive worker. Similarly, the wage 
subsidy employers receive is rewarding to them and also to the partici 
pants, who receive full pay for a period of partially subsidized work. For 
measurement purposes, employer costs and benefits may be treated as if 
they accrued only to employers. However, interpretations of research 
findings should recognize that the most effective systems can probably 
benefit all actors employer and participant benefits need not be mutu 
ally exclusive.
Employer outcomes are not specified in JTPA legislation. Nor is there 
a long tradition of past research focusing on and defining them. Indeed, 
our initial directions in exploring possible measures are the result of two
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major limits to measurement and research design in this case: the lack 
of prior development in this area of research, and the inability of gross 
impact research to estimate net impacts.
Employer Estimates of Their Own Costs and Benefits 
Within the limits of the gross impact approach, the true net impact of 
JTPA on employers cannot be estimated. That would require compari 
sons with employers hiring non-JTPA participants. Nevertheless, we can 
ask employers to give us their estimates of their costs and benefits. This 
may be accomplished by specifying a break-even point for each measure 
of cost or benefit, and asking employers to report whether their experi 
ence with JTPA or with specific JTPA participants fell above or below 
that point. The break-even point differs by type of measure and is 
discussed below. The strategy in each case is to express the measure in 
terms simulating true or perceived net cost or benefit, by wording the 
measure in terms of break-even point and offering responses on either 
side of that point. 14
Although such an approach is far from true net impact, it may provide 
knowledge of employer outcomes and how they combine or offset each 
other. This, in turn, will build a knowledge base required before concep 
tualizing a net impact analysis. In particular, we can analyze the degrees 
of association among different measures of cost or benefit and assess the 
relative importance employers assign to these factors. However, the 
main value of this approach is that it allows approximations of employer 
costs or benefits useful for guiding program development.
Measurement Strategy in a New Area of Study
As a relatively new area of study, employer benefits cannot be 
measured definitively. It is possible to specify a range of probable 
benefits and costs, but too little is known about each or about their 
relative worth to employers to develop a precise, meaningful accounting. 
Some of these costs and benefits, such as the OJT wage subsidy, can be 
expressed in precise monetary terms. Others may be equally important 
to analyze, but impossible to quantify or even to conceptualize clearly. 15 
They include the following:
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1. The major indication that hiring a JTPA participant was rewarding 
to an employer is a decision to retain the participant. It might also be 
possible to estimate how far above or below a break-even point (a 
point of indifference, neither costly nor rewarding) each partici 
pant's performance falls; however, such estimates would remain 
speculative.
2. Fear that JTPA participants may have serious problems not easily 
observed before hire is impossible to quantify in precise monetary 
terms, but is a very important cost for many employers (Simpson 
1984b). Even when no problems arise, the perceived risk that they 
might occur represents a cost.
3. Provision of training is costly to participating employers. Assigning 
quantitative values to employer training, however, is difficult be 
cause most training is informal; more training may be planned than 
occurs; most training would be offered to all new employees regard 
less of JTPA involvement; and much of the training may be so 
specific to the particular employer that it binds the worker to that job 
rather than transferring to other employment situations, introducing 
a hidden benefit.
Other elements of the JTPA program are complex to conceptualize 
because they may act as either costs or benefits. For example, employee 
screening can be a service to employers, but giving partial control over 
screening to an agency whose goal is serving the disadvantaged may be 
costly. Similarly, hiring the disadvantaged is typically assumed to be one 
cost to participating employers. Yet, one study of GET A OJT employers 
found that over one-tenth of the respondents listed the knowledge that 
"you are helping others with need" as the major reason for participating 
in OJT (Simpson 1984b).
We face these measurement challenges primarily because little work 
has been completed in this area, and many of the most important costs and 
rewards to employers are inherently perceptual and, therefore, not 
readily susceptible to monetary quantification. The approach suggested 
by gross impact analysis is to develop multiple measures of potential 
costs and benefits to employers and investigate the extent to which each 
is perceived by employers to act as a cost or a benefit in then* specific 
cases. The following are some examples:
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1. Once we learn which aspects of JTPA employers estimate to be most 
costly and most rewarding and how important they perceive different 
costs and benefits to be, analysts can begin to define and prioritize 
employer outcomes.
2. We can analyze whether particular types of employers have different 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of JTPA, and whether these 
ideas are associated with greater or lesser program success for par 
ticipants.
3. We can test ideas about the ways in which JTPA is rewarding or 
costly to employers. Rather than assuming that particular JTPA 
services, such as client screening, are costly or rewarding to employ 
ers, we can examine the extent to which the implementation of these 
services increases or decreases the rewards or costs perceived by 
employers.
4. We can analyze the association among different measures of cost 
and benefit. Are costs of providing services higher where benefits, 
such as the subsidy to participants' wages, are higher? Do employers 
who receive high levels of one type of benefit tend to receive less of 
others, or is JTPA implementation such that some agencies reward 
employers across-the-board more than others do?
Outcomes for Termination Employers
Any employer's major costs or benefits from hiring are the job 
performance qualities of the new employee. For termination employers 
who did not participate in delivering JTPA services, this is the only 
source of cost or benefit relevant to JTPA. The question for them is 
whether the new JTPA-trained employee will function in the job as well 
as other appropriately trained new workers. There is no reason to expect 
JTPA participants to be better trained than others; the goal of JTPA is 
to eliminate participants' previous deficits.
Each area of worker performance of importance to the employer 
represents one dimension, or scale, of cost or benefit. How many days' 
work will the new employee miss during the first month? How much 
employer training will be required before the worker becomes produc 
tive? How much supervision time will be saved by a "self-starting"
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worker? Cost and benefit represent two ends of each scale. The break 
even point lies at the point on the scale that represents the average new 
(non-JTPA) hire for that job in that labor market, as perceived by the 
employer. If the average new-hire misses four days' work per month, 
hiring a former JTPA participant who misses an average of two days 
represents a benefit to the employer.
For employee qualities that are not naturally quantified, the former 
JTPA participant may be compared with the average non-JTPA hire for 
that same job, using a rating scale such as "much better," "a little better," 
"about the same," "a little worse," "much worse." Qualities to measure 
include skill level, speed and quality of work productivity, indicators of 
supervisability, and indicators of adjustment to the job.
In the case of any one participant, job performance may be better or 
worse than average for reasons unrelated to JTPA participation or 
referral. However, if, over a large number of employer interviews, the 
average JTPA hire proves to be more satisfactory to employers than their 
average non-JTPA hires, we have reason to claim a role for JTPA in 
producing that benefit to employers. 16
A second possible benefit to termination employers is a former 
participant's job retention record throughout the follow-up period, and 
whether further retention is likely. Retention implies that the worker is 
productive and adjusted, and also wishes to remain employed. Unless job 
loss results from cutbacks forced by declining business, laying off a 
trained worker indicates a cost to the employer: the cost of hiring and 
retraining another worker, and loss of productivity during the training 
period. (See Vermeulen and Hudson-Wilson 1981.) Whether these costs 
occur because participants perform poorly or because they quit is also 
valuable to explore.
Outcomes for Participating Employers
An employee's productivity and tractability during the training con 
tract represent major costs or benefits to employers who take part in the 
JTPA program. After the contract, they may become termination em 
ployers by hiring the participant they trained. At this point all the benefits 
discussed above apply. Beyond these, the most obvious benefit is the 
subsidy to participant wages.
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By far the most common reason employers give for participating in 
OJT is the subsidy. Other explanations commonly reported include 
eliminating the need to screen large numbers of applicants, the ability to 
expand or to stabilize without mounting the full cost for the new 
employee, and satisfaction at being able to assist deserving individuals 
(Simpson 1984b). Commonly reported costs include the time and super 
vision required to train, the potential of greater-than-average worktime 
lost to personal or family problems, the possibility that maximum 
performance after training will not match that of other employees, and 
the possibility that JTPA employees might turn over faster than others 
would.
One element of employer costs has declined dramatically since early 
CETA programs: the degree of constraint experienced by the employer. 
O'Neil's (1982) analysis of employer hesitance to use "targeted jobs tax 
credits" demonstrates that the sheer fact of being constrained can be 
costly to employers. Earlier CETA programs protected their right to 
serve participants with greatest need, but in so doing, raised the employer 
constraint expenses above the threshold allowing participation.
Some of these costs or benefits have break-even points of zero. For 
example, the OJT wage subsidy cannot be costly in and of itself, and 
paperwork requirements cannot be seen as benefits; they can at best pose 
zero cost. Other benefits and costs to participating employers are 
meaningful only when a break-even point is defined in comparison to 
typical employees who would be hired were it not for the JTPA program. 
The two major outlays JTPA wishes participating employers to accept 
are hiring individuals who appear to be less qualified for the job than 
typical non-JTPA hires, and providing extra training beyond that re 
quired by typical non-JTPA hires. The issue is not, for example, whether 
the OJT employer loses five or 10 weeks of productive time during 
training, but whether the difference in training time for typical non-OJT 
hires vs. the OJT hire is zero, five, or 10 weeks. A difference of zero 
weeks represents a break-even point on that particular measure.
There is no a priori method to establish a balance between major costs 
and benefits for participating employers. Program policymakers must 
decide whether they are satisfied with the differences employers report
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between JTPA participants and other hires, given the JTPA reimburse 
ment they receive. Data on employer benefits and costs simply make 
decisions such as setting the level of OJT reimbursement more rational.
Even so, such interpretations may be less obvious than many program 
managers suppose. In particular, it is not always the case that employer- 
based programs work best for participants when employers receive 
maximum benefit from participation, as demonstrated by economic 
theory regarding nonsubsidized on-the-job training (Maranto and Rodg- 
ers 1984; Hoffman 1981). Employers always engage in introductory 
OJT, specific to the firm and to the job. This training represents part of 
the employer's investment in hiring any new employee. The typical 
sequence is hire with intention to retain, invest in training, and retain as 
planned.
The subsidized OJT situation differs from this typical sequence in that 
the training occurs before the decision to retain, and the training may not 
be the result of a decision to invest in training. If the total cost of training 
a JTPA participant is greater than the income derived from the wage 
subsidy, the employer must decide to invest in training, which in turn 
implies a commitment to hire if possible, so as not to waste the 
investment. If, however, an SDA offers subsidies equal to or larger than 
the employer's cost, the employer may participate without ever having 
decided to invest in the participant. The reason may be kind "Now I can 
afford to help this person." Or, it may be hard-nosed "I make more 
money hiring OJTs, even if I increase turnover by letting them go after 
the contract ends."
At the extreme, some participating employers use the federal wage 
subsidy without incurring the expense of providing any services. In- 
depth interviews with CETA OJT employers located some who explic 
itly stated that they provided no training and refused to alter their hiring 
practices at all, choosing instead simply to gather the windfall wherever 
one of their new hires happened to be OJT eligible (Simpson 1984b). 
Therefore, service providers are presumably well-advised to balance 
costs and benefits for participating employers in such a way that 
outcomes are positive, but not so positive as to protect employers from 
making an investment in each participant they train.
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Outcomes Measured through Agency Records
The most basic benefits accruing to participating employers are finan 
cial, and may be recorded directly from JTPA contracts. This form of 
measurement is preferred because it is highly reliable, it indicates both 
planned and actual expenditures, and it avoids the awkwardness of 
asking about money during telephone interviews. In addition, agencies 
may be able to estimate the amount of screening and referral time they 
provided, thereby offsetting employer hiring costs. The question of how 
effective the screening was is separate, and must be measured during 
employer interviews.
Outcomes Measured through Employer Surveys
In addition to measures listed earlier for termination employers, par 
ticipating employers incur a number of costs during their contracts, and 
also experience the potential costs and benefits of working with JTPA 
agencies. These may be measured through follow-ups, in the form of 
employer reports of their activities or perceptions of JTPA. Presumably 
the most basic costs incurred in the case of OJT are training costs. 
Although small employers seldom estimate training costs, they can 
report length of typical training for a given position, length and intensity 
of JTPA training compared to non-JTPA training, whether specialized 
methods, curricula, or personnel are used during training, etc.
Measures of perceived participation risk. Participating employers 
face the costs of accepting risk or constraint from their involvement with 
JTPA. Although particular JTPA participants may prove to be ideal 
workers, a program offering subsidies in exchange for hiring particular 
individuals has some implied risk. Employers may fear that the employee 
could be a poor worker, an alcoholic, or a thief. This felt risk may loom 
larger than the actual costs experienced when a particular worker 
performs poorly. The JTPA agency could also attempt to constrain the 
employer's behavior, or unexpected paperwork demands could develop. 
These possibilities may be expensive in employers' perceptions.
At the other extreme, the employer could reduce risk by retaining 
control over the hiring process. In the most extreme case, employers 
make firm hiring decisions before sending their new employees to apply
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for the OJT subsidy. Since this practice undercuts the hiring-incentive 
role of OJT wage reimbursement, employer reports may be somewhat 
biased, depending on guarantees of confidentiality. At a more interme 
diate level, JTPA staff, recognizing employers' fear of risk, may screen 
so carefully that the risk factor is neutralized. Thus, valuable knowledge 
may be gained from measures of employers' "felt-risk," employers' 
control over screening, and the degree to which JTPA staff screen out 
participants least job-ready (and therefore most in need).
Measures of employers' direct assessment of participation costs and 
benefits. Employers may also be asked for their direct assessments of the 
costs or benefits of participating. Most of the measures suggested thus far 
have been indirect, in that they ask employers to rate a particular JTPA 
participant or placement experience. This approach has the value of 
defusing employer concerns about being evaluated, i.e., clarifying that it 
is the employee who is being evaluated, and it allows aggregation of quite 
precise information regarding a representative sample of participants.
Certain employer outcomes, moreover, are best estimated in a direct 
form. Employers can be asked to evaluate JTPA services and staff, and 
to indicate how beneficial or costly they found specific aspects of 
participation to be. Some measures, such as the subsidy to wages, help 
in enlarging or stabilizing the work force, or the good feeling of helping 
others, can logically represent only some degree of benefit. Others, such 
as JTPA applicants' screening, may represent costs or benefits, depend 
ing on their quality. 17
The Characterization of the Employment 
Establishment and of the Participant's Position within It
When one goal of employer surveys is to perform differential impact 
analysis of participant outcomes, employment-establishment character 
istics and participant-selection-and-training characteristics should be 
included among employer measures. The following three levels of 
measurement specificity are encountered: 
1. Measures characterizing the entire employment establishment, such
as number of employees, industrial sector, or referral patterns
established with JTPA.
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2. Measures applying to any employee with the same job held by the 
JTPA participant, such as job complexity, qualifications required for 
that job, or training level of typical non-JTPA hires.
3. Measures applying specifically to each JTPA participant, such as the 
length of training received, or employer's ratings of that participant. 
In cases where SDAs envision repeated local employer follow-ups, 
efficiency can be increased and nuisance to employers decreased by 
treating categories 1 and 2 as once-only measures analogous to those for 
service providers. Category 1 measures could be taken during an initial 
work-up with each new employer. Category 2 measures would be 
gathered once for each separate job title into which each employer 
accepted JTPA participants. Such measures are easily integrated into 
program operation where employer or participant analyses are envi 
sioned. They can be combined with participant data for analysis as long 
as both employer and participant data include an identifier for each 
employer.
An Illustration of Differential Impact 
Analysis Including Employer Data
A summary of selected findings from the Washington State CETA 
OJT study discussed earlier will serve to illustrate the application of 
differential impact analysis (Simpson 1984a). That study analyzed data 
from a nine-month follow-up of 881 OJT participants and 517 OJT 
employers who trained them. In addition, data from participant MIS files, 
state labor and industry sources, and surveys with all OJT service 
providers in the CETA system were combined with data from the two 
follow-up surveys. Selected findings relevant to one program develop 
ment issue quality control over OJT placements are summarized 
here.
There is a continuing question concerning the extent to which OJT 
represents a training intervention, with employers reimbursed for addi 
tional training costs demanded by their program participation, or a hiring 
incentive program in which employers provide little service except to 
hire from the list of eligibles. In addition, during the period immediately 
preceding the 1982-83 data collection for this analysis, the State of
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Washington had decided to rather dramatically expand its OJT program, 
raising the question of whether pressure to enlarge the pool of new 
employers led to a deterioration in the quality of OJT placements.
While gross impact analysis cannot assess the net impact of OJT for 
participants, we were able to test a series of propositions comparing 
forms of OJT implementation that placed greater or lesser emphasis on 
quality control. We were also to compare specific OJT placements that 
appeared to provide service to participants of greater or lesser quality. 
The following summarizes findings from differential impact analysis of 
these implementation and treatment variants on postprogram outcomes. 
All of these reports are for the outcome variable most clearly affected by 
programmatic variables whether or not one retained employment with 
the original OJT employer. 18
1. Various qualities of OJT implementation and treatment explain far 
more variation in outcomes than do the full set of participant 
background characteristics included in MIS files and augmented by 
measures on the follow-up survey, although age and employment 
history have considerable impact. This was true in part, we learned, 
because so many OJT positions were entry level, making such 
minimal demands that some highly qualified OJT enrollees left 
voluntarily, thus undermining program success.
2. Service provider measures indicating the degree to which strong 
quality control procedures were a part of their OJT program implem 
entation proved strongly associated with the rate at which partici 
pants retained their OJT positions through the nine-month follow- 
up. A number of factors raised OJT retention: more demanding 
quality review for new and old employers, a policy demanding 
higher than minimum wage for OJT placements, and a willingness 
to hold some money back because an insufficient number of satisfac 
tory employers were available for OJT. We estimated a 28 percent 
difference in OJT retention rates, above and beyond other factors, 
between agencies placing most and least emphasis on quality control.
3. Consistent with the interpretation that OJT in this system was 
suffering from low quality control, a set of measures designed to 
measure the quality of participant training also indicated higher OJT
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retention where training had been more intensive. In particular, 
employers who reported offering any special instruction for OJT 
participants, who used more formal preparation along with informal 
OJT, and who had more personal involvement in the training 
retained their participants more often. The impact of these factors 
was modest because training intensity overlaps with two other 
powerful predictors of retention: the complexity of the job, and the 
participant's enthusiasm for the work.
4. While it is common to worry about OJT participants' ability to meet 
their job demands, the reverse proved much more problematic in this 
study. The less background the participant reported having in the 
area of the OJT job and the more complex the employer described the 
job as being, the higher the OJT retention (after adjustments for 
participant background characteristics). We found that only 7 per 
cent of the participants were fired for inability to do the work, while 
10.3 percent gave boredom with the job or getting no training as the 
main reason they quit, and another 14 percent left for a better job. In 
all, 31 percent quit, while 21.7 percent were fired or left by mutual 
agreement with the employer. 19
5. The three strongest predictors of OJT retention were the employer's 
rating of how enthusiastic and cooperative the participant was, the 
employer's rating of how fast the participant worked, and the partici 
pant's felt importance of retaining a career in the type of work rep 
resented by the OJT job. All these turn out to be much higher when 
the job is more complex, when OJT positions provide more training, 
when participants are moving into a new area of work rather than 
being placed in a job about which they know a great deal, when 
employers more frequently provide evaluative feedback to partici 
pants, and where service providers emphasize quality control. The 
higher the quality of the OJT placement, the more likely participants 
were to like the job and treat it as a career they valued, and in turn 
display behaviors employers wanted to see.
These findings conclude that in that particular OJT system at that time 
the program needed to develop quality control over the nature of the OJT 
site, i.e., the services offered by employers. One other troublesome
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finding consistent with this concern for quality was the discovery that 
some employers in that sample were explicitly using the OJT reimburse 
ment as windfall profit.
Although employer-initiated OJTs were quite common in this sample 
(45.8 percent of all OJTs), most of these represented referrals by 
knowledgeable employers who made no hiring decision until eligibility 
was established. Postprogram success in these cases was no higher than 
average. However, one-sixth (17.3 percent) of the employers we inter 
viewed said they first made a firm hiring decision and then sent the 
participant to CETA to see if a wage subsidy could be gained.20 This 
phenomenon represents both a poor expenditure of training dollars and 
a selection mechanism likely to bias outcome estimates. Among these 
participants, retention was 12 percent higher, after adjusting for other 
factors.
This set of findings was chosen to illustrate the value of differential 
impact analysis because many separate tests lead consistently to the same 
conclusion, and because that conclusion is in essence opposite to the 
normal interpretation of weak program performance. When one service 
provider performs at a higher (descriptive) rate than another, nearly all 
analysts will ask whether that difference was produced by "creaming," 
i.e., whether the finding represents selection bias. Few will ask, however, 
whether participants were too highly qualified, relative to the quality of 
the OJT jobs and training. Yet, careful quantitative analysis of program 
implementation and treatment confirms the latter interpretation in this 
one service delivery system.
How Gross Impact Analysis
Complements Net Impact and Process Evaluations
The most valuable uses of the gross impact evaluation method and 
also its major limitations may be placed in relief by a brief examination 
of the ways in which the three approaches in this volume complement 
each other. The gross impact approach exploits its measurement flexibil 
ity to enlarge the range of outcomes analyzed as well as the range of 
factors considered as influences on outcomes, yet the quantitative nature 
of its measures helps insure that conclusions are reliable.
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In the Washington State CETA OJT example, the gross impact 
analysis provided no knowledge of the net value of that OJT system to 
its participants. If we had employed both the net and the gross impact 
approaches, the major value of the gross impact findings would have 
been to broaden the range of measures analyzed both outcomes and 
programmatic factors that might have influenced the net impact. These 
measures would have increased our ability to explain how the system 
works to produce the high or low net impacts we identified, providing 
guidance on improving net impact. Without a net impact evaluation, we 
do not know how urgent the need for system improvement is. Without the 
gross impact evaluation, we have less guidance regarding the mecha 
nisms needed to improve a system.21
At the other end of the continuum lies process analysis. Its detailed 
analysis of program implementation feeds gross impact analysis by 
identifying measures worthy of quantification. Only when the analyst 
understands the process by which organizations operate will meaningful 
outcomes be selected for measurement, or will the analysis of program- 
variant effects upon outcomes be meaningful. The centrality of implem 
entation factors to differential impact analysis means that gross impact 
analysis is in part quantified process analysis and should always be 
preceded by at least a partial process analysis.
In addition to its focus on outcomes, gross impact analysis adds four 
major complements to process analysis: (1) postprogram outcome 
measures, (2) quantitative precision of measurement, which allows 
reliable estimates of the impact of program variants on outcomes, (3) 
reliable comparisons across multiple service providers or treatments, 
and (4) measurement of individual service treatments as possible influ 
ences on outcomes, along with measurement of the implementation 
factors also emphasized by process analysis.
Because process evaluation avoids the limits of formal, quantitative 
data collection, it can be flexible, creative, and unique. However, for the 
same reason, i.e., process analysis does not collect quantitative data, 
conclusions from process analysis are subject to considerable error, 
which can be reduced by subjecting the conclusions of process evalu 
ations to a gross impact analysis. Such interpretations can be tested in
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multiple contexts and can include a range of measures indicating individ 
ual treatment as well as program implementation. Thus, for example, a 
process evaluation conclusion that an organization is less effective than 
it might be because of some particular element in its internal structure can 
be tested by comparing outcomes, as indicators of effectiveness, among 
organizations differing with regard to that structure.
The CETA OJT study, discussed in order to illustrate differential 
impact analysis, began its conceptualization phase with an informal 
process analysis. Our aim was to identify alternative theories regarding 
OJT system operation, program variants likely to impact outcomes, and 
program variants that could be changed if policymakers decided to use 
our findings to improve program performance. While standard variables 
for such research were also measured, several analyses that proved to be 
most fascinating involved variables that emerged from the process 
analysis. Had the research ended at the process analysis stage, these ideas 
could not have been tested and could not have generated quantitative 
estimates of the impact which program variants can have on outcomes.
Chapter Summary
The major goal of the gross impact evaluation approach presented here 
has been to improve the technology available to managers of human 
services organizations. Technology, in this case, is knowing how to 
operate programs that effectively produce the desired outcomes trans 
forming clients with given needs at intake into postprogram success 
stories. Gross impact analysis approaches that goal with two distinct 
analytic strategies: the analysis of descriptive gross outcomes, and 
differential impact analysis. These analyses are performed using data 
from several possible sources: MIS files, participant interviews, data 
from service providers on individual treatments and program implemen 
tation, and data from others, such as employers, who may be closely 
involved in the operation or outcomes of the program.
The analysis of descriptive gross outcomes is useful because it is 
simple. It is also dangerous, for the same reason. The following steps may 
be taken to enhance the usefulness of descriptive outcome measures: (1)
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broadening the range of outcomes studied, to provide fuller interpreta 
tions of how the program is functioning; (2) tailoring measures and 
analysis questions to make findings more meaningful; (3) measuring 
views of those whose perceptions have prima facia meaning (e.g., 
employers); and (4) insuring high technical standards during data collec 
tion and analysis. Analysts can also protect against misuse of descriptive 
reports by limiting the nature of their interpretations to those merited, 
given the limitations of the analysis.
The second analytic approach, differential impact analysis, is more 
expensive and also more useful for program development. This method 
increases the level of technology available to managers by testing the 
relative effectiveness of alternative forms of program implementation or 
service treatments provided to individuals. That is, differential impact 
analysis estimates the degree to which difference in postprogram out 
comes is caused by any given program variant. Each alternative is tested 
against other alternatives which are in place in the service delivery 
system.
Further, differential impact analysis attacks the problem of selection 
bias, the primary factor limiting the validity of descriptive gross outcome 
reports and inhibiting causal interpretations. By using a variety of 
sources to measure selection processes as well as client characteristics 
predictive of postprogram success, the most powerful "alternative expla 
nation" facing all program evaluation that outcomes were produced by 
client characteristics or selection rather than by the program can be 
greatly mitigated, if never completely eliminated.
Thoughtful preparation of survey data collection tools and appropriate 
use of analysis techniques, available in a wide range of statistical 
packages, can make differential impact analysis a powerful tool for 
improving program performance on mandated outcomes. At the same 
time, the wide spectrum of measurable and describable gross outcomes 
can be used to improve or maintain the quality of service while core 
outcomes are being maximized. Findings apply directly to the state or 
local service delivery systems in which the evaluation was conducted, 
directing managers to increase some services or retain some implemen 
tation forms, while reducing others. Local applicability of findings,
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protection against selection bias, and testing of alternative program 
variants provide the basic components of quasi-experimental causal 
analysis, so that careful differential impact analysis produces results that 
can more accurately identify factors influencing program effectiveness. 
Changing these factors is, therefore, likely to produce improvement in 
effectiveness.
NOTES
1. Whether each group is better off because of participating in the program is a net impact question. 
Gross impact analysis identifies which services work better for each group.
2. The range of available alternative explanations may be identified by asking managers of 
programs that are performing poorly to explain their organizations' weak showing.
3. The aim of all research is to increase or reduce our confidence in particular conclusions or 
interpretations. To reject new information because it is imperfect is as foolish as to embrace 
unreliable findings wholeheartedly. The analyst must assess the value of any research finding. 
Structuring the research so that findings are firmer improves the value of the research, even if the 
method remains considerably less than perfect.
4. Since these results are descriptive only, this interpretation is also subject to error. It could be, 
for example, that more AFDC recipients leave their OJT positions because they are unstable, while 
non-AFDC recipients leave in order to move to higher paying jobs in nonrelated areas. Such 
possibilities can be tested if the researcher has entertained them early enough to make the data 
available. In this case, for example, more non-AFDC people did quit for better jobs, but not enough 
more to invalidate the initial interpretation offered in the text.
5. This figure and others in this series may be somewhat lower than typical since Washington was 
experiencing rather serious recession during this study.
6. Above and beyond the obvious reason that JTPA now requires such a definition.
7. One topic of particular interest to small SDAs involves the correction downward of the sample 
needed for a given error margin when the population from which the sample is drawn is very small.
8. This does suggest one possible pitfall of low-budget program evaluation: if surveys are 
conducted m-house, respondents may bias their answers in a positive direction. Sophisticated 
external consumers will therefore tend to question findings based on surveys, unless they are 
conducted by third parties and guarantee confidentiality.
9. These membership identifiers also serve as extremely important control variables under con 
ditions discussed later in the chapter.
10. The term "membership identifier" has been used throughout this chapter to refer to what 
statisticians typically call "dummy variables." The standard rules governing proper analysis of 
dummy variables should be followed during the analysis descnbed here. If all membership identi 
fiers are entered simultaneously, only n-1 may be included. For example, if 15 service providers are 
included in the sample, membership identifiers (dummy variables) indicating 14 may be included in 
a single regression equation. If the analysis involves a forward stepwise procedure, n (all) 
membership identifiers may be included.
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11. It should be noted that because interaction terms are highly correlated with their constituent 
variables, analysts should consult the change in variance explained (R!) rather than relying on t or 
F scores for each individual variable within the model
12. When programs are most successful, nearly all participants are employed after the program. 
Variance in earnings is greatest when a large proportion of participants earns nothing.
13. Optionally, a wntten form with anonymous return could be administered by staff, but not 
without the problems of return rate and secretarial overload which accompany mail surveys.
14. Examples of such questions as they appear in a survey are available in Simpson (1986).
15. For a set of specific suggested measures that have been pre-tested among JTPA employers, see 
Simpson, 1986.
16. One difficulty with survey data emerges here. Respondents often tend to bias their reports in 
a positive direction, so that the midpoint of any set of answers is always a bit above the face validity 
midpoint. Thus, if a group of employers were asked to rate all their employees, the average employee 
would be rated somewhat above average Analysts should bear this in mind when interpreting 
employer ratings. However, no precise information exists with which to estimate to what extent 
responses are inflated, making adjustments imprecise.
17. See Simpson (1986) for specific measurement suggestions for this issue as for other employer 
issues.
18. One of our more intriguing findings was that the ability to regain other employment once the 
OJT position was lost was almost entirely immune to interpretation via program variables. That is, 
the impact of the OJT program or, rather, any variations in its implementation extended only to 
getting and retaining the original OJT job.
19. For valid measurement of issues such as this one, it proved especially useful to have data from 
both the employer and the participant.
20. Presumably, employers were so candid with us because we were a neutral third party. Some 
employers even offered explicit statements that they viewed the entire process, cynically, as a 
windfall.
21. It is possible in theory, and at great expense, to conduct net impact evaluations that include a 
broad range of outcome measures. The cost-efficient design suggested in this volume by Johnson 
foregoes this possibility to make the research feasible for states and large SDAs. Any quantitative 
analysis of a wide range of program variants automatically becomes a gross impact analysis because 
these measures are meaningful only among participants. An untreated comparison group must, 
therefore, be omitted from such an analysis.
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